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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/11/06/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-3/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-3</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/11/06/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-3/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Nov 2014 15:00:39 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hedge funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[This year has seen a continuance of the high and increasing level of activist campaigns experienced during the last 14 years, from 27 in 2000 to nearly 250 to date in 2014, in addition to numerous undisclosed behind-the-scenes situations. Today, regardless of industry, no company can consider itself immune from potential activism. Indeed, no company [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Thursday, November 6, 2014 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton" target="_blank">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton and <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/SVNiles/" target="_blank">Sabastian V. Niles</a>. Recent work from the Program on Corporate Governance about hedge fund activism includes: <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577" target="_blank">The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/19/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism/">here</a>); <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2248111" target="_blank">The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value</a> by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/04/22/the-myth-that-insulating-boards-serves-long-term-value/">here</a>); <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884226" target="_blank">The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/06/27/should-the-sec-tighten-its-13d-rules/">here</a>); and <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258083" target="_blank">Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>This year has seen a continuance of the high and increasing level of activist campaigns experienced during the last 14 years, from 27 in 2000 to nearly 250 to date in 2014, in addition to numerous undisclosed behind-the-scenes situations. Today, regardless of industry, no company can consider itself immune from potential activism. Indeed, no company is too large, too popular or too successful, and even companies that are respected industry leaders and have outperformed peers can come under fire. Among the major companies that have been targeted are, Amgen, Apple, Microsoft, Sony, Hess, P&amp;G, eBay, Transocean, ITW, DuPont, and PepsiCo. There are more than 100 hedge funds that have engaged in activism. Activist hedge funds have approximately $200 billion of assets under management. They have become an “asset class” that continues to attract investment from major traditional institutional investors. The additional capital and new partnerships between activists and institutional investors have encouraged increasingly aggressive activist attacks.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/11/06/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-3/#more-66630" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Dealing With Activist Hedge Funds">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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