Category Archives: Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation

The Pursuit of Gender Parity in the American Boardroom

Mary Jo White is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on Chair White’s recent Keynote Remarks at the Women’s Forum of New York; the full text, including footnotes, is available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair White and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

The Women’s Forum of New York remains the critical, groundbreaking organization for successful women that it was when it held its first meeting in 1974. That was, by coincidence, the year I graduated from Columbia Law School. As one benchmark of progress, that year’s graduating class was only 17 percent women. Today that number is 45 percent and, in some years, it is higher.

We all have indeed come a long way since 1974. Today, women receive more than half of all bachelors’, masters’ and doctorate degrees, and more than a third of MBAs. Women are approximately half of the total workforce and half of all managers. But there remain areas stubbornly resistant to the progress that objectively should have already occurred. One in the legal profession is the percentage of women who are equity partners at law firms—18 percent. That number has only increased two percent since 2006, and we had achieved 12.9 percent back in 1994. Another resistant area is the financial arena—we now account for 29 percent of senior officials in finance and insurance, and no woman has, for example, ever been CEO of one of the 22 largest U.S. investment banks or financial firms. A third critical area that has been a particular priority for the Women’s Forum of New York is the focus of today’s event: gender diversity in U.S. boardrooms.


Management Philosophies and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms

William Mullins is Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Maryland. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Mullins and Antoinette Schoar, Professor of Finance at MIT.

A growing body of evidence supports the view that there are substantial differences in the management styles and skill sets of individual CEOs, and these differences seem to translate into effects on firm performance and how firms operate. However, we know little about what drives these differences in CEO behavior. In particular, we do not know if the management philosophies and styles of CEOs vary with the governance structure or ownership of the firm (for example, whether it is a family firm or widely held firm), or even across countries. One view is that the extent to which they take a stakeholder approach to management—in opposition to a shareholder focused approach—is an important determinant of CEO behavior. Family members as CEO might be more likely to adopt a stakeholder view, since they have a longer horizon and care about the reputation of the family beyond profit maximization. An alternative view holds that greater emphasis on stakeholder management is a feature of entire countries, evolving in response to aspects of the economy as a whole, rather than to firm-specific characteristics.

In our paper, How Do CEOs See Their Roles? Management Philosophies and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we explore how the interplay of firm level and country level factors shape CEO management styles and beliefs regarding their roles.


Shadow Resolutions as a “No-No” in a Sound Banking Union

Luca Enriques is Allen & Overy Professor of Corporate Law at Oxford University. The following post is based on a paper co-authored by Professor Enriques and Gerard Hertig.

Credit crisis related bank bailouts and resolutions have been actively debated over the past few years. By contrast, little attention has been paid to resolution procedures being generally circumvented when banks are getting insolvent in normal times.

In fact, supervisory leniency and political considerations often result in public officials incentivizing viable banks to acquire failing banks. In our book chapter Shadow resolutions as a no-no in a sound Banking Union, published in Financial Regulation: A Transatlantic Perspective 150-166 (Ester Faia et al. eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2015, we consider this a very unfortunate approach. It weakens supervision, distorts competition and, most importantly, gives resolution a bad name.


Corporate Governance Responses to Director Rule Changes

Cindy Vojtech is an Economist at the Federal Reserve Board. This post is based on an article authored by Dr. Vojtech and Benjamin Kay, Economist at the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Financial Research.

Much of the corporate governance literature has been plagued by endogeneity problems. In our paper, Corporate Governance Responses to Director Rule Changes, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we use a law change as a natural experiment to test how firms adjust the choice and magnitude of governance tools given a floor level of monitoring from independent directors. Through this analysis, we can recover the structural relationship between inputs in the governance production function. We study these relationships with a new board of director dataset with a much larger range of firm size.

In 2002, U.S. stock exchanges and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established minimum standards for director independence. These director rules altered firm choice of other tools for mitigating agency problems. On average, treated firms do not increase the size of their board, instead inside directors are replaced with outside directors.


SEC Disclosures by Foreign Firms

Audra Boone is a senior financial economist at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis. This post is based on an article authored by Dr. Boone, Kathryn Schumann, Assistant Professor of Finance at James Madison University, and Joshua White, Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Georgia. The views expressed in the post are those of Dr. Boone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commissioners, or the Staff.

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) established the ongoing reporting regime for U.S.-listed foreign firms when most of these filers were large, well-known companies that had a primary trading venue on a major foreign exchange. Accordingly, prior work argues that the SEC exempted these firms from producing quarterly and event-driven filings beyond those mandated by their home country or exchange. [1] Specifically, the SEC stipulates that foreign firms must supply ongoing disclosures on a Form 6-K only when they publicly release information outside the U.S. (e.g., updates on earnings, acquisitions, raising capital, or payout structure). [2]

The composition of foreign firms listing in the U.S. has evolved over the years towards one with more firms stemming from less transparent countries and those lacking a primary listing outside the U.S. Notably, foreign firms with these characteristics likely have fewer ongoing reporting mandates, and thus considerable discretion regarding the information they supply to the SEC. Yet, there is little evidence on how the deference to home country requirements affects ongoing reporting and information flows in more recent periods. Studying these issues helps understand the relative trade-offs of creating a competitive landscape for attracting foreign firm listings and ensuring meaningful information flows to investors, thus balancing capital formation and investor protection.

Securing Our Nation’s Economic Future

Leo E. Strine, Jr. is Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, the Austin Wakeman Scott Lecturer on Law and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. This post is based on Chief Justice Strine’s recent keynote address to the Fellows Colloquium of the American College of Governance Counsel, available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here), The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here), and Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, by Leo E. Strine (discussed on the Forum here).

These days it has become fashionable to talk about a subject some of us have been addressing for some time: [1] whether the incentive system for the governance of American corporations optimally encourages long-term investment, sustainable policies, and therefore creates the most long-term economic and social benefit for American workers and investors. Many commentators have come to the conclusion that the answer to that question is no. They bemoan the pressures that can lead corporate managers to quick fixes like offshoring, which might give a balance sheet a short-term benefit, but cut our nation’s long-term prospects. They lament the relative tilt in corporate spending toward stock buybacks and away from spending on capital expenditures. They look at situations where corporations took environmental or other regulatory short-cuts, which ended up in disaster, and ask whether anyone is thinking about sustainable approaches. They rightly point to the accounting gimmickry involved in several high-profile debacles and ask what it has to do with the creation of long-term wealth for human investors.


Seven Myths of Boards of Directors

David Larcker is Professor of Accounting at Stanford University. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Larcker and Brian Tayan, Researcher with the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at Stanford University. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Costs of Entrenched Boards by Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen, and How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment by Alma Cohen and Charles C. Y. Wang.

Corporate governance experts pay considerable attention to issues involving the board of directors. Because of the scope of the board’s role and the vast responsibilities that come with directorship, companies are expected to adhere to common best practices in board structure, composition, and procedures. Our paper, Seven Myths of Boards of Directors, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, reviews seven commonly accepted beliefs about boards of directors that are not substantiated by empirical evidence.


Executive Overconfidence and Compensation Structure

Ling Lisic is Associate Professor of Accounting at George Mason University. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Lisic; Mark Humphery-Jenner, Senior Lecturer at UNSW Business School; Vikram Nanda, Professor of Finance and Managerial Economics at University of Texas at Dallas; and Sabatino Silveri, Assistant Professor of Finance at the University of Memphis. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The CEO Pay Slice by Lucian Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers and Urs Peyer (discussed on the Forum here).

In our paper “Executive Overconfidence and Compensation Structure,” forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we investigate whether overconfidence affects the compensation structure of CEOs and other senior executives. There is a burgeoning literature on the impact of CEO overconfidence on corporate policies. Overconfident CEOs are prone to overestimate returns to investments and to underestimate risks. Little is known, however, about the nature of incentive contracts offered to overconfident managers or even whether firms “fine-tune” compensation contracts to match a manager’s personality traits. We help fill this gap.


The Important Work of Boards of Directors

Luis A. Aguilar is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Commissioner Aguilar’s recent address at the 12th Annual Boardroom Summit and Peer Exchange. The full text, including footnotes, is available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Aguilar and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

It’s a great honor to be back again speaking at an event sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange. It has been more than six years since, as a relatively new SEC Commissioner, I had the opportunity to ring the closing bell at the Exchange. Of course, a lot has changed since then.

At the time, the country was in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, and our capital markets were in turmoil. Some of our most storied financial institutions had suffered unparalleled economic damage. The money market fund industry was mired in a crisis of confidence, interbank lending had collapsed, and our short-term capital markets had seized up. To stem the bleeding, the federal government engaged in an unprecedented intervention in the financial sector to inject stability and confidence into the capital markets and to the greater economy.

Regulatory Competition in Global Financial Markets

Wolf-Georg Ringe is Professor of International Commercial Law at Copenhagen Business School and at the University of Oxford. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Ringe.

The decades-long discussion on the merits of regulatory competition appears in a new light on the global financial market. There are a number of strategies that market participants use to avoid the reach of regulation, in particular by virtue of shifting trading abroad or else relocating activities or operations of financial institutions to other jurisdictions. Where this happens, such arbitrage can trigger regulatory competition between jurisdictions that may respond to the relocation of financial services (or threats to relocate) by moderating regulatory standards. Both arbitrage and regulatory competition are a reality in today’s global financial market, and the financial sector is different from their traditional fields of application: the ease of arbitrage, the fragility of banking and the risks involved are exceptional. Most importantly, regulatory arbitrage does not or only rarely occurs by actually relocating the financial institution itself abroad: rather, banking groups tend to shift trading to foreign affiliates.


  • Subscribe

  • Cosponsored By:

  • Supported By:

  • Programs Faculty & Senior Fellows

    Lucian Bebchuk
    Alon Brav
    Robert Charles Clark
    John Coates
    Alma Cohen
    Stephen M. Davis
    Allen Ferrell
    Jesse Fried
    Oliver Hart
    Ben W. Heineman, Jr.
    Scott Hirst
    Howell Jackson
    Robert J. Jackson, Jr.
    Wei Jiang
    Reinier Kraakman
    Robert Pozen
    Mark Ramseyer
    Mark Roe
    Robert Sitkoff
    Holger Spamann
    Guhan Subramanian

  • Program on Corporate Governance Advisory Board

    William Ackman
    Peter Atkins
    Joseph Bachelder
    John Bader
    Allison Bennington
    Daniel Burch
    Richard Climan
    Jesse Cohn
    Isaac Corré
    Scott Davis
    John Finley
    David Fox
    Stephen Fraidin
    Byron Georgiou
    Larry Hamdan
    Carl Icahn
    Jack B. Jacobs
    Paula Loop
    David Millstone
    Theodore Mirvis
    James Morphy
    Toby Myerson
    Morton Pierce
    Barry Rosenstein
    Paul Rowe
    Rodman Ward