Tag: Capital allocation


Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms

The following post comes to us from John GrahamCampbell Harvey, and Manju Puri, all of the Finance Area at Duke University.

The following post comes to us from John GrahamCampbell Harvey, and Manju Puri, all of the Finance Area at Duke University.

In our paper, Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we use a unique data set that contains information on more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) around the world to investigate the degree to which executives delegate financial decisions and the circumstances that drive variation in delegation. Our results can be grouped into four themes.

READ MORE »

Firm Boundaries Matter

The following post comes to us from Amit Seru, Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago.

The following post comes to us from Amit Seru, Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago.

Do firm boundaries affect the allocation of resources? This question had spawned significant research in economics since it was raised in Coase (1937). A large body of work has focused on comparing the resource allocation in conglomerates relative to stand-alone firms to shed light on this issue. Theoretically, there are competing views on this aspect. On the one hand, Alchian (1969), Wiliamson (1985), and Stein (1997), among others, have put forth the view that conglomerates, by virtue of exerting centralized control over the capital allocation process, may do a better job in directing investments than the external capital markets. On the other hand, the “dark side” view of internal capital markets argues that problems of corporate socialism are more prevalent in conglomerates making them less efficient in resource allocation (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).

READ MORE »

The Role of the Media in Corporate Governance

The following post comes to us from Baixiao Liu of the Department of Finance at Florida State University, and John McConnell, Professor of Finance at Purdue University.

The following post comes to us from Baixiao Liu of the Department of Finance at Florida State University, and John McConnell, Professor of Finance at Purdue University.

In an open capital market economy, guided by market signals, firms (and their managers) play an important role in the allocation of capital. Zingales (2000) proposes that the media may also play a role, perhaps positive, perhaps negative, in guiding firms (and their managers) in making capital allocation decisions. Dyck and Zingales (2002) develop this idea more fully. Given that the media collect, aggregate, disseminate, and amplify information, and to the extent that this information affects managers’ reputations, they propose that managers are sensitive to the way in which the media report and comment upon their decisions. Managers may even be sensitive to whether the media reports on their decisions at all. After all, a bad decision that goes unnoticed may be no worse than a good decision that goes equally unnoticed.

In our paper, The Role of the Media in Corporate Governance: Do the Media Influence Managers’ Capital Allocation Decisions?, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we investigate whether, and to what extent, managers of publicly-traded U.S. corporations are sensitive to public news media in making one specific type of capital allocation decision. To wit: the decision of whether to complete or abandon a large proposed corporate acquisition that is accompanied by a negative stock market reaction at the announcement (“value-reducing acquisition attempt”). More specifically, we investigate whether the likelihood that a value-reducing acquisition attempt is abandoned is related to the level of media attention given to the attempt and to the tone of media coverage regarding the acquirer’s attempt at the time of the acquisition announcement.

READ MORE »

Resource Allocation within Firms and Financial Market Dislocation

The following post comes to us from Gregor Matvos and Amit Seru, both of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago.

The following post comes to us from Gregor Matvos and Amit Seru, both of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago.

Do firm boundaries mediate the effect of shocks to the financial intermediation sector? When the functioning of the intermediation sector is impaired – as was the case in the recent financial crisis – shocks can be transmitted to the broader economy since funds may not flow to highest value use without incurring significant cost. This issue has been extensively explored in the credit channel literature (e.g., Kashyap and Stein [2000]; Bernanke and Blinder [1988; 1992], and Bernanke and Gertler [1995]). However, unlike what is assumed in this literature, firms may be able to reallocate resources internally – for instance, between divisions in different industries – to ameliorate the effect of financial shocks. If so, external credit market conditions will impact the nature of resource allocation inside firms and between industries differently than they would in an economy with no internal capital markets. Diversified firms constitute a large part of economies around the world; therefore, resource allocation within firms can be of significant importance. In this paper we propose that firms shift resources between industries in response to shocks to the financial sector. We estimate a structural model to quantify the forces driving this reallocation decision, and show that these forces dampen shocks to the financial sector in economically significant ways.

READ MORE »

Considering Causes and Remedies for Declining IPO Volume

Editor’s Note: The following post comes to us from Jay R. Ritter, Cordell Professor of Finance at the University of Florida’s Warrington College of Business Administration. This post is based on Professor Ritter’s testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, available here.

I will first give some general remarks on the reasons for the low level of U.S. IPO volume this decade and the implications for job creation and economic growth, and then make some suggestions on the specific bills that the Senate is considering.

First, there is no doubt that fewer American companies have been going public since the tech stock bubble burst in 2000, and the drop is particularly pronounced for small companies. During 1980-2000, an average of 165 companies with less than $50 million in inflation-adjusted annual sales went public each year, but in 2001-2011, the average has fallen by more than 80%, to only 29 small firm IPOs per year. The patterns are illustrated in Figure 1.

READ MORE »

Investor Protection is Needed for True Capital Formation

Editor’s Note: Luis A. Aguilar is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on a speech by Commissioner Aguilar; the full speech, including footnotes, is available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Aguilar and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff. Last week the U.S. Senate passed the JOBS Act, with some amendments from the version passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on March 8, 2012.

Recently, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3606, the “Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act.” It is clear to me that H.R. 3606 in its current form weakens or eliminates many regulations designed to safeguard investors. I must voice my concerns because as an SEC Commissioner, I cannot sit idly by when I see potential legislation that could harm investors. This bill seems to impose tremendous costs and potential harm on investors with little to no corresponding benefit.

H.R. 3606 concerns me for two important reasons. First, the bill would seriously hurt investors by reducing transparency and investor protection and, in turn, make securities law enforcement more difficult. That is bad for ordinary Americans and bad for the American economy. Investors are the source of capital needed to create jobs and expand businesses. True capital formation and economic growth require investors to have both confidence in the capital markets and access to the information needed to make good investment decisions.

READ MORE »

The Flight Home Effect

The following post comes to us from Mariassunta Giannetti, Professor of Finance at the Stockholm School of Economics, and Luc Laeven of the International Monetary Fund and Professor of Finance at Tilburg University.

The following post comes to us from Mariassunta Giannetti, Professor of Finance at the Stockholm School of Economics, and Luc Laeven of the International Monetary Fund and Professor of Finance at Tilburg University.

In our paper, The Flight Home Effect: Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Market During Financial Crises, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics,  we study whether lenders, when hit by shocks that negatively affect bank wealth in their home market, have a tendency to rebalance their portfolio away from international markets to their domestic market. We explore this flight home effect in the context of the syndicated loan market, a large and highly internationalized financial market.

After controlling for demand shocks in foreign markets, we explore whether foreign lenders not only transmit shocks to foreign markets, as established in existing literature, but also whether they amplify these effects by substituting foreign loans for domestic loans. To establish whether this is the case, we analyze how the relative importance of a bank’s domestic and foreign loans varies following negative shocks.

Our results are consistent with the existence of a flight home effect. The proportion of loans granted to domestic borrowers increases by approximately 20 percent if the home country of the bank experiences a banking crisis, or more generally, if banks’ stock prices in the home country show a large decline. Lenders with less stable funding sources, being more vulnerable to negative liquidity shocks (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), exhibit a stronger flight home effect. Overall, the results indicate that the home bias in the international allocation of syndicated loans increases in the presence of adverse economic shocks affecting the net wealth of international lenders.

READ MORE »

Managerial Investment and Changes in GAAP

The following post comes to us from Nemit Shroff of the Department of Accounting at MIT.

The following post comes to us from Nemit Shroff of the Department of Accounting at MIT.

In my paper, Managerial Investment and Changes in GAAP: An Internal Consequence of External Reporting, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, I investigate whether changes in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) affect corporate investment decisions. I hypothesize that the relation between changes in GAAP and investment manifests for at least two non-mutually exclusive reasons. First, I hypothesize that changes in GAAP can affect investment because the numbers reported in financial statements have a direct bearing on contractual outcomes. For example, debt contracts often contain covenants based on numbers reported in financial statements (Leftwich [1983]). Consequently, if a change in GAAP has an unfavorable (favorable) impact on current and future financial statements, and debt covenants are not adjusted to incorporate the changes, the change in GAAP will likely tighten (loosen) covenant slack. As a result, managers may alter their actions to avoid covenant violation. Specifically, since most investments have an uncertain future outcome and some positive probability that the outcome is a loss, they increase the probability of violating covenants in the future by adversely impacting future financial ratios. Consequently, managers might respond to changes in GAAP that adversely affect financial statements by cutting investment in risky assets with the goal of preserving net worth and preventing deterioration of financial ratios.

READ MORE »

On the Importance of Internal Control Systems in the Capital Allocation Decision

The following post comes to us from David De Angelis of the Department of Finance at Cornell University.

The following post comes to us from David De Angelis of the Department of Finance at Cornell University.

In the paper, On the Importance of Internal Control Systems in the Capital Allocation Decision: Evidence from SOX, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, I investigate the effects of information problems across corporate hierarchies on internal capital allocation decisions by using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment of a shock to the level of information frictions across corporate hierarchies. SOX requires firms to enhance their internal control systems in order to improve the reliability of financial reporting across corporate hierarchies.

I find that after SOX the capital allocation decision is more sensitive to performance as reported by the business segments. The changes in sensitivity of investment to performance are more pronounced for conglomerates that are more prone to information problems across corporate hierarchies, such as conglomerates with more segments and conglomerates that restated their earnings in the past. Moreover, in the post-SOX era, firms do not rely on past performance in their capital allocation decision when auditors report material weaknesses in their internal controls. The productivity advantage of conglomerates over stand-alone firms increases after SOX. In addition, conglomerates and segments that are more affected by SOX exhibit a larger increase in future profitability after SOX. Furthermore, the excess value of conglomerate firms relative to stand-alone firms increases (i.e., the conglomerate discount decreases). These changes in the internal capital allocation process are not associated with economic activities, financial constraints, or tensions between the management and shareholders.

READ MORE »

Investor Protection and Its Effects on Investment, Finance, and Growth

The following post comes to us from David McLean of the Department of Finance at the University of Alberta, Tianyu Zhang of the Accounting Department at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Mengxin Zhao of the Department of Finance at the University of Alberta.

The following post comes to us from David McLean of the Department of Finance at the University of Alberta, Tianyu Zhang of the Accounting Department at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Mengxin Zhao of the Department of Finance at the University of Alberta.

In the paper, Why Does the Law Matter? Investor Protection and its Effects on Investment, Finance, and Growth, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, we study how investor protection affects firm-level resource allocations. We test for these effects using both ex-ante and ex-post measures of efficiency. We conduct our analyses in a large sample of firms from 44 countries during the period 1990 to 2007. We show that the relations between q and investment and q and external finance are stronger in countries with stronger investor protection laws. These findings are consistent with the notion that investor protection laws encourage accurate share prices, efficient investment, and better access to external finance.

READ MORE »

  • Subscribe

  • Cosponsored By:

  • Supported By:

  • Programs Faculty & Senior Fellows

    Lucian Bebchuk
    Alon Brav
    Robert Charles Clark
    John Coates
    Alma Cohen
    Stephen M. Davis
    Allen Ferrell
    Jesse Fried
    Oliver Hart
    Ben W. Heineman, Jr.
    Scott Hirst
    Howell Jackson
    Robert J. Jackson, Jr.
    Wei Jiang
    Reinier Kraakman
    Robert Pozen
    Mark Ramseyer
    Mark Roe
    Robert Sitkoff
    Holger Spamann
    Guhan Subramanian

  • Program on Corporate Governance Advisory Board

    William Ackman
    Peter Atkins
    Joseph Bachelder
    John Bader
    Allison Bennington
    Richard Breeden
    Daniel Burch
    Richard Climan
    Jesse Cohn
    Isaac Corré
    Scott Davis
    John Finley
    Daniel Fischel
    Stephen Fraidin
    Byron Georgiou
    Larry Hamdan
    Carl Icahn
    David Millstone
    Theodore Mirvis
    James Morphy
    Toby Myerson
    Barry Rosenstein
    Paul Rowe
    Rodman Ward