Tag: Clawbacks

2015 Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey

Creighton Condon is Senior Partner at Shearman & Sterling LLP. This post is based on the introduction to a Shearman & Sterling Corporate Governance Survey by Bradley SabelDanielle Carbone, David Connolly, Stephen Giove, Doreen Lilienfeld, and Rory O’Halloran. The complete publication is available here.

We are pleased to share Shearman & Sterling’s 2015 Corporate Governance & Executive Compensation Survey of the 100 largest US public companies. This year’s Survey, the 13th in our series, examines some of the most important governance and executive compensation practices facing boards today and identifies best practices and merging trends. Our analysis will provide you with insights into how companies approach governance issues and will allow you to benchmark your company’s corporate governance practices against the best practices we have identified.


The SEC Proposed Clawback Rule

Joseph E. Bachelder is special counsel in the Tax, Employee Benefits & Private Clients practice group at McCarter & English, LLP. The following post is based on an article by Mr. Bachelder which first appeared in the New York Law Journal. Andy Tsang, a senior financial analyst with the firm, assisted in the preparation of this column. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Excess-Pay Clawbacks by Jesse Fried and Nitzan Shilon (discussed on the Forum here).

On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Proposed Rule 10D-1 relating to so-called “clawbacks” pursuant to Section 10D of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). Section 10D of the Exchange Act was added by Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).

(On Aug. 5, 2015 the SEC issued its final rule requiring the disclosure of the ratio of the annual pay of the CEO to the median annual pay of all employees (excluding the CEO). Issuers subject to the rule must comply with it for the first fiscal year beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2017. The pay ratio rule will be the subject of a future post.)


Harvard Convenes the 2015 Executive Compensation & Corporate Governance Roundtable

The Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and the Harvard Law School Program on Institutional Investors convened the Harvard Roundtable on Executive Compensation & Corporate Governance last Wednesday, October 21, 2015. The event brought together for a roundtable discussion 62 prominent experts with a wide range of perspectives on the subject, including senior officers from leading institutional investors (both mutual funds and public pension funds) with aggregate assets under management exceeding $13 trillion, and from significant issuers, prominent advisors, and academics. Participants in the event, and the topics of discussion, are set out below.

The Roundtable discussion on issues relating to the process of determining executive compensation included discussion of the work of proxy advisors and their interaction with investors and issuers, engagement between issuers and investors themselves and compensation disclosure issues, such as pay-for-performance disclosure and pay-ratio disclosure. The Roundtable then moved to a discussion of the substantive terms of compensation arrangements, including compensation levels, composition, and structures. Issues that were considered included the composition of long-term and short-term incentive pay and contractual provisions such as claw-backs and hedging policies. The Roundtable ended with a discussion of current issues in corporate governance, including lessons from the 2015 proxy season, current thinking on engagement with investors, and proxy access.

The Roundtable was co-organized by Lucian Bebchuk, Stephen Davis, and Scott Hirst, and was supported by a number of co-sponsors (listed here), the supporting organizations of the Program on Corporate Governance (listed on the program site here), and the institutional members of the Harvard Institutional Investor Forum (listed here).

The participants in the Harvard Roundtable on Executive Compensation & Corporate Governance included:


2016 Proxy Season Update

Laura D. Richman is counsel and Michael L. Hermsen is partner at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on a Mayer Brown Legal update, available here, authored by Laura D. Richman, Robert F. Gray, Michael L. Hermsen, Elizabeth A. Raymond, and David A. Schuette.

It is time for public companies to think about the upcoming 2016 proxy and annual reporting season. Preparation of proxy statements and annual reports requires a major commitment of corporate resources. Companies have to gather a great deal of information to produce the necessary disclosures. In addition, with increasing frequency, companies are choosing to implement the required elements of their proxy statements with a focus on shareholder engagement, seeking to clearly present, and effectively advocate for, their positions on annual meeting agenda items. As the process for the 2016 proxy and annual reporting season begins, there are a number of recent developments that public companies should be aware of that will impact current and future seasons.

This post is divided into five sections covering the following topics:


Remuneration in the Financial Services Industry 2015

Will Pearce is partner and Michael Sholem is European Counsel at Davis Polk LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum by Mr. Pearce, Mr. Sholem, Simon Witty, and Anne Cathrine Ingerslev. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Regulating Bankers’ Pay by Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann (discussed on the Forum here), The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008 by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Holger Spamann, and How to Fix Bankers’ Pay by Lucian Bebchuk.

The past year has seen the issue of financial sector pay continue to generate headlines. With the EU having put in place a complex web of overlapping law, regulation and guidance during 2013 and 2014, national regulators are faced with the task of interpreting these requirements and imposing them on a sometimes skeptical (if not openly hostile) financial services industry. This post aims to assist in navigating the European labyrinth by providing a snapshot of the four main European Directives that regulate remuneration:

  • Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV);
  • Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD);
  • Fifth instalment of the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS V); and
  • Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).


SEC Charges Computer Sciences Corporation & Former Executives With Accounting Fraud

Nicholas S. Goldin is a partner and Yafit Cohn is an associate at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher publication.

On June 5, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) entered into settled administrative cease-and-desist proceedings with Computer Sciences Corporation (“CSC”) and some of its former executives due to the company’s alleged manipulation of financial results and concealment of problems with the company’s largest contract. [1] Among other things, CSC agreed to pay a $190 million penalty to settle the charges, and two of CSC’s former executives agreed to return a portion of their compensation to CSC pursuant to the clawback provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The SEC also charged former CSC finance executives for ignoring accounting standards to increase reported profits.

Factual Background and SEC Findings

CSC entered into a contract with the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (“NHS”) to build and deploy an electronic patient record system. The contract had the potential to earn CSC $5.4 billion in revenue if the company satisfied the timeframes outlined in the contract. The contract also included penalties of up to $160,000 per day for missed deadlines. CSC had trouble developing the software. CSC and NHS amended the contract, NHS agreeing to waive the penalties in exchange for certainty of deployment of the electronic record system on an agreed upon date. It later became clear that CSC would not be able to meet its commitments under the amended contract either.


The UK’s Final Bonus Compensation Rule

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Roozbeh Alavi, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Regulating Bankers’ Pay by Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann (discussed on the Forum here); The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008 by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Holger Spamann; and How to Fix Bankers’ Pay by Lucian Bebchuk.

On June 23rd, the UK’s Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) [1] finalized a joint bonus compensation rule that was proposed last July. While the industry (including subsidiaries and branches of US banks in the UK) had hoped for a more lenient approach, the final rule generally retains the proposal’s stringent requirements, especially with respect to bonus deferral periods and clawbacks. [2]

The rule applies to “senior managers” [3] and other “material risk takers” [4] at UK banks and certain investment firms. As finalized, the rule establishes the toughest regulatory approach to bonus compensation of any major jurisdiction, going beyond the EU-wide CRD IV. [5] Therefore, unless regulators in other major jurisdictions take a similar approach, institutions that are active in the UK are placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to their peers elsewhere.


SEC Proposes Compensation Clawback Rules

Holly J. Gregory is a partner and co-global coordinator of the Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation group at Sidley Austin LLP. The following post is based on a Sidley update. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Excess-Pay Clawbacks by Jesse Fried and Nitzan Shilon (discussed on the Forum here).

On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), by a 3-2 vote, proposed long-awaited rules [1] mandated by Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act that would direct the national securities exchanges and associations to establish listing standards that would require any company to adopt, disclose and comply with a compensation clawback policy as a condition to listing securities on a national securities exchange or association. With the proposal of the clawback rules, the SEC has now proposed or adopted rules to implement all of the Dodd-Frank Act provisions relating to executive compensation.

The clawback policy would be required to provide that, in the event that the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to material noncompliance with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the company would recover from any of its current or former executive officers (not just named executive officers) who received incentive-based compensation during the preceding three-year period based on the erroneous data, any such compensation in excess of what would have been paid under the accounting restatement. In addition to requiring that a company file its clawback policy as an exhibit to its annual report on Form 10-K or 20-F, as applicable, the proposed rules would require proxy statement disclosure of certain actions taken pursuant to the clawback policy.

SEC Proposes Rules on Mandatory Clawback Policies

Renata J. Ferrari is partner tax & benefits department at Ropes & Gray LLP. This post is based on a Ropes & Gray Alert.

On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed rules to require issuers of securities listed on U.S. stock exchanges to adopt and enforce clawback policies applicable to incentive-based compensation received by current and former executives in the three-year period preceding the date the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to material noncompliance with financial reporting requirements. The proposed rules would implement the “no fault” clawback rule requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Section 10D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended).


Clawbacks of Erroneously Awarded Compensation

Michael S. Piwowar is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Commissioner Piwowar’s recent remarks at a recent open meeting of the SEC; the full text is available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Piwowar and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

A few months ago, the baseball world celebrated the 90th birthday of Yogi Berra, the legendary former catcher and manager for the New York Yankees. Yogi Berra is well-known for his witty comments, often referred to as “Yogi-isms.” [1] Several come to mind today, as we consider another rulemaking related to executive compensation.

“Pair up in threes.”

Following our earlier efforts on hedging and pay versus performance, today’s proposal is the third relating to executive compensation that we have considered in 2015. The Commission has yet again spent significant time and resources on a provision inserted into the Dodd-Frank Act that has nothing to do with the origins of the financial crisis and affects Main Street businesses that are not even part of the financial services sector. Why does the Commission continue to prioritize our agenda with these types of issues, when rulemakings that are directly related to the financial crisis remain unaddressed?


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  • Programs Faculty & Senior Fellows

    Lucian Bebchuk
    Alon Brav
    Robert Charles Clark
    John Coates
    Alma Cohen
    Stephen M. Davis
    Allen Ferrell
    Jesse Fried
    Oliver Hart
    Ben W. Heineman, Jr.
    Scott Hirst
    Howell Jackson
    Robert J. Jackson, Jr.
    Wei Jiang
    Reinier Kraakman
    Robert Pozen
    Mark Ramseyer
    Mark Roe
    Robert Sitkoff
    Holger Spamann
    Guhan Subramanian

  • Program on Corporate Governance Advisory Board

    William Ackman
    Peter Atkins
    Joseph Bachelder
    John Bader
    Allison Bennington
    Daniel Burch
    Richard Climan
    Jesse Cohn
    Isaac Corré
    Scott Davis
    John Finley
    David Fox
    Stephen Fraidin
    Byron Georgiou
    Larry Hamdan
    Carl Icahn
    Jack B. Jacobs
    Paula Loop
    David Millstone
    Theodore Mirvis
    James Morphy
    Toby Myerson
    Morton Pierce
    Barry Rosenstein
    Paul Rowe
    Rodman Ward