Tag: Corporate crime

U.S. Enforcement Policy and Foreign Corporations

John F. Savarese is a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Savarese, David GruensteinRalph M. LeveneDavid B. Anders, and Lauren M. Kofke.

We recently reported on a new U.S. Department of Justice policy which expanded expectations for corporate cooperation in white collar investigations. While the initial wave of attention given to the DOJ pronouncement focused on U.S. companies, this new policy is also important for all companies with operations in the U.S. or whose activities otherwise bring them within the long arm of U.S. enforcement jurisdiction. Underscoring the relevance of these new policies to non-U.S. companies, Deputy Attorney General Yates noted in her remarks announcing the new policy that among “the challenges we face in pursuing financial fraud cases against individuals” is the fact that “since virtually all of these corporations operate worldwide, restrictive foreign data privacy laws and a limited ability to compel the testimony of witnesses abroad make it even more challenging to obtain the necessary evidence to bring individuals to justice.”


DOJ Adopts New Requirements for Corporations Seeking Credit for Cooperation

John F. Savarese is a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Savarese, Ralph M. LeveneWayne M. CarlinJonathan M. Moses, and David B. Anders.

In an important development for corporations responding to federal investigations, the Department of Justice announced on September 10, 2015 revisions to its Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organization (“Principles”). The new policies, set out in a memorandum authored by Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates and sent to federal prosecutors across the nation, instruct prosecutors to focus their efforts to secure evidence against individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing. The memorandum (accessible here) specifically encourages increased attention by DOJ attorneys on considering cases against individual wrongdoers, and also establishes additional guidelines that federal prosecutors and civil enforcement attorneys must follow in conducting and resolving corporate investigations.


DOJ Provides “Best Practices” for Corporate Internal Investigations

Eugene Illovsky is a partner at Morrison & Foerster LLP. This post is based on a Morrison & Foerster publication by Mr. Illovsky.

What does the Department of Justice think is a high-quality internal investigation? How does DOJ decide whether an investigation was good enough to help a company avoid, or at least mitigate, criminal charges? In recent speeches, DOJ has provided important guidance on its view of best practices, and some useful common-sense reminders, for our clients’ counsel and their investigating board committees. Much of that guidance came in May 19, 2015 remarks by Criminal Division head Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell, as well as in other recent speeches.

AAG Caldwell made clear that DOJ does indeed take the time to scrutinize and “evaluate the quality of a company’s internal investigation.” She explained that the Department does this evaluation “through our own investigation” as well as “in considering what charges to bring against a company.”


Governance Challenges Arising From “Corporate Cooperation” Concepts

Michael W. Peregrine is a partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP. This post is based on an article by Mr. Peregrine, with assistance from Joshua T. Buchman and Kelsey J. Leingang; the views expressed therein do not necessarily reflect the views of McDermott Will & Emery LLP or its clients.

The current Department of Justice emphasis on “corporate cooperation” in the context of government investigations creates the potential for significant tension to arise between governance and executive leadership, which potential should be recognized and addressed proactively by the board.

The DOJ Criminal Division has, with notable frequency this spring, sought to increase public transparency as to the process it applies when making a decision with respect to corporate prosecutions. A principal goal of DOJ’s public effort is to clarify the parameters it considers in deciding how to proceed when made aware of alleged corporate wrongdoing. This goal includes making the value of cooperation, and the consequences of noncooperation, more clearly apparent to corporations and their advisors. [1]


Holding Corporate Officers and Directors Accountable for Failures of Corporate Governance

The following post comes to us from Greg M. Zipes, a trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice. This post is based on his article Ties that Bind: Codes of Conduct that Require Automatic Reductions to the Pay of Directors, Officers, and Their Advisors for Failures of Corporate Governance that was recently published in the Journal of Business and Securities Law. All comments are in Mr. Zipes’ individual capacity and do not reflect the views of the Department of Justice.

Executives and directors at large corporations rarely face personal liability for failures of oversight that lead to large penalties or losses to their companies. As outlined in my recent article, the American consumer can help provide a solution to this lack of accountability.

I propose that corporate executives and directors sign binding codes of conduct requiring them to uphold specific standards within their corporations. They would agree to specific, transparent reductions in compensation if they fail to live up to these standards. This proposal does not rely on the altruism of these corporate heads to sign. Rather, it assumes that those consumers, dismayed by corporate excesses, will direct at least a portion of their business towards those companies with executives who are willing to put their compensation on the line.


White Collar and Regulatory Enforcement: What To Expect In 2015

John F. Savarese is a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum.

Yet again, the past year has witnessed a staggering array of massive financial settlements in regulatory and white collar matters. Prominent examples, among many others, include Toyota, which was fined $1.2 billion in connection with resolving an investigation into safety defects; BNP, which pleaded guilty and paid $8.9 billion to resolve criminal and civil investigations into U.S. OFAC and other sanctions violations; Credit Suisse, which also pleaded guilty and paid $2.6 billion to resolve a long-running cross-border criminal tax investigation; and the global multi-agency settlements with six financial institutions for a total of $4.3 billion in fines, penalties and disgorgement in regard to allegations concerning attempted manipulation of foreign exchange benchmark rates. The government also continued to generate headlines with settlements arising out of the financial crisis, including settlements with numerous financial institutions totalling more than $24 billion. We have no reason to expect that this trend will change in 2015.


2014 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements

Joseph Warin is partner and chair of the litigation department at the Washington D.C. office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. The following post is based on a Gibson Dunn client alert; the full publication, including footnotes and appendix, is available here.

The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) continue to deploy DPAs and NPAs aggressively. This past year left no doubt that such resolutions are a vital part of the federal corporate law enforcement arsenal, affording the U.S. government an avenue both to punish and reform corporations accused of wrongdoing. In early December, for example, U.S. Assistant Attorney General for DOJ’s Criminal Division, Leslie Caldwell, highlighted the importance of negotiated resolutions that allowed DOJ to “impose reforms, impose compliance controls, and impose all sorts of behavioral change.” She concluded: “In the United States system at least [settlement] is a more powerful tool than actually going to trial.” DOJ and the SEC have used negotiated resolutions, including DPAs and NPAs, to require companies to implement an effective compliance program. In 2014 we witnessed a number of notable developments in negotiated resolutions that demonstrate that the traditional hallmarks of DPAs and NPAs, including post-settlement compliance and reporting obligations, are here to stay.


“Need to Know” White Collar Enforcement Trends for Directors

The following post comes to us from Michael W. Peregrine, partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP. This post is based on an article by Mr. Peregrine; the views expressed therein do not necessarily reflect the views of McDermott Will & Emery LLP or its clients.

The ability of corporate directors to exercise effective judgment and oversight will be aided by an awareness of emerging white collar enforcement trends of the federal government.

These trends are primarily reflected in a notable series of significant speeches and other public comments made this fall by representatives of the Department of Justice. These include speeches made by senior officials of DOJ’s Criminal and Antitrust Divisions, as well as Attorney General Holder. Collectively, these trends may help to inform boards with respect to transactional planning, risk evaluation and compliance oversight, among other critical matters.


Second Circuit Overturns Insider Trading Convictions

John F. Savarese is a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Savarese, Wayne M. Carlin, and David B. Anders.

Earlier today [Wednesday, December 10, 2014], the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an important decision overturning the insider trading convictions of two portfolio managers while clarifying what the government must prove to establish so-called “tippee liability.” United States v. Newman, et al., Nos. 13-1837-cr, 13-1917-cr (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 2014). The Court’s decision leaves undisturbed the well-established principles that a corporate insider is criminally liable when the government proves he breached fiduciary duties owed to the company’s shareholders by trading while in possession of material, non-public information, and that such a corporate insider can also be held liable if he discloses confidential corporate information to an outsider in exchange for a “personal benefit.”


Justice Deferred is Justice Denied

The following post comes to us from Peter R. Reilly of Texas A&M School of Law.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), deferred prosecution agreements are said to occupy an “important middle ground” between declining to prosecute on the one hand, and trials or guilty pleas on the other. A top DOJ official has declared that, over the last decade, the agreements have become a “mainstay” of white collar criminal law enforcement; a prominent criminal law professor calls their increased use part of the “biggest change in corporate law enforcement policy in the last ten years.”


  • Subscribe

  • Cosponsored By:

  • Supported By:

  • Programs Faculty & Senior Fellows

    Lucian Bebchuk
    Alon Brav
    Robert Charles Clark
    John Coates
    Alma Cohen
    Stephen M. Davis
    Allen Ferrell
    Jesse Fried
    Oliver Hart
    Ben W. Heineman, Jr.
    Scott Hirst
    Howell Jackson
    Robert J. Jackson, Jr.
    Wei Jiang
    Reinier Kraakman
    Robert Pozen
    Mark Ramseyer
    Mark Roe
    Robert Sitkoff
    Holger Spamann
    Guhan Subramanian

  • Program on Corporate Governance Advisory Board

    William Ackman
    Peter Atkins
    Joseph Bachelder
    John Bader
    Allison Bennington
    Daniel Burch
    Richard Climan
    Jesse Cohn
    Isaac Corré
    Scott Davis
    John Finley
    David Fox
    Stephen Fraidin
    Byron Georgiou
    Larry Hamdan
    Carl Icahn
    Jack B. Jacobs
    Paula Loop
    David Millstone
    Theodore Mirvis
    James Morphy
    Toby Myerson
    Morton Pierce
    Barry Rosenstein
    Paul Rowe
    Rodman Ward