Tag: Corporate Social Responsibility


Human Rights Through A Corporate Governance Lens

George Dallas is Policy Director at International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN). The following post is based on an ICGN publication by Mr. Dallas and Lauren Compere, Managing Director at Boston Common Asset Management; the complete publication, including annexes, is available here.

George Dallas is Policy Director at International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN). The following post is based on an ICGN publication by Mr. Dallas and Lauren Compere, Managing Director at Boston Common Asset Management; the complete publication, including annexes, is available here.

Human rights [1] are attracting increasing attention from a corporate governance perspective as a dimension of both business ethics and enterprise risk management for companies. Indeed, the ethical and risk dimensions are in many ways intertwined, insofar as ethical lapses or inattention to human rights practices by companies may not only breach the human rights of those affected by corporate behaviour, but may also have material commercial consequences for the company itself. In extreme cases human rights problems can pose a franchise risk to companies [2]; in lesser cases these can increase costs and damage valuable relationships with stakeholders.

In a broad governance context human rights cannot be simply framed as a reputational or “non-financial” risk; the consequences of poor human rights practices can materially impact a company’s stakeholder relations, financial performance and prospects for sustainable value creation. Accordingly, human rights is an issue warranting greater attention from long-term investors as a matter of investment analysis, valuation and engagement with companies.

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Corporations and the 99%: Team Production Revisited

Shlomit Azgad-Tromer is a researcher at Tel Aviv University—Buchmann Faculty of Law. This post is based on the article Corporations and the 99%: Team Production Revisited. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Growth of Executive Pay by Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein, and The CEO Pay Slice by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

Shlomit Azgad-Tromer is a researcher at Tel Aviv University—Buchmann Faculty of Law. This post is based on the article Corporations and the 99%: Team Production Revisited. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Growth of Executive Pay by Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein, and The CEO Pay Slice by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

“We Are the 99%” is a political slogan used by the Occupy Wall Street movement, referring to the prevailing wealth and income inequality, and claiming a divergence of corporate America from the public. The article explores the interaction between the general public and the public corporation, and its legal manifestation.

Stakeholder theory portrays the corporation as a sphere of cooperation between all stakeholder constituencies, including the general public. Revisiting team production analysis, the article argues that while several constituencies indeed form part of the corporate team, others are exogenous to the corporate enterprise. Employees, suppliers and financiers contribute together to the common corporate enterprise, enjoying a long-term relational contract with the corporation, while retail consumers contract with the corporation at arm’s length, and other people living alongside the corporation do not contract with it at all. Under this organizational model, the general public may participate in the team forming the corporate enterprise by providing public financing. Indeed, corporate law was developed to protect public investors.

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Shareholder Proposal Landscape

The following post comes to us from Ernst & Young LLP, and is based on a publication by the EY Center for Board Matters.

The following post comes to us from Ernst & Young LLP, and is based on a publication by the EY Center for Board Matters.

Institutional investors are increasingly communicating their expectations around governance through direct engagement and letter writing campaigns. Still, some continue to rely on shareholder proposals to trigger dialogue and help ensure a topic is raised at the board level.

Investors that submit proposals generally view them as an invitation to a discussion, preferring to reach agreement with the targeted company without the proposal going to a vote. If agreement cannot be reached, they generally believe that votes on shareholder proposals provide management with valuable insights into investor views.

The EY Center for Board Matters recently had conversations with 50 institutional investors, investor associations and advisors on their corporate governance views and priorities for the 2015 proxy season.

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Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does “Difference” Make?

The following post comes to us from Deborah L. Rhode, the Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director of the Center on the Legal Profession at Stanford University, and Amanda K. Packel, the Deputy Director of the Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance, a joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

The following post comes to us from Deborah L. Rhode, the Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director of the Center on the Legal Profession at Stanford University, and Amanda K. Packel, the Deputy Director of the Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance, a joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

In recent years, increasing attention has focused on the influence of gender and racial diversity on boards of directors. More than a dozen countries now require some form of quotas to increase women’s representation on boards, and many more have voluntary quotas in corporate governance codes. In the United States, support for diversity has grown in principle, but progress has lagged in practice, and controversy has centered on whether and why diversity matters.

In our article, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does “Difference” Make?, which was recently published in Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 39, no. 2, Fall 2014, we evaluate the case for diversity on corporate boards of directors in light of competing research findings. An overview of recent studies reveals that the relationship between diversity and financial performance has not been convincingly established. There is, however, some theoretical and empirical basis for believing that when diversity is well managed, it can improve decision-making and enhance a corporation’s public image by conveying commitments to equal opportunity and inclusion. We believe increasing diversity should be a social priority, but not for the reasons often assumed. The “business case for diversity” is less compelling than other reasons rooted in social justice, equal opportunity, and corporate reputation. Our article explores the rationale for diversity and strategies designed to address it.

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The First Annual Conflict Minerals Filings: Observations and Next Steps

Amy Goodman is a partner and co-chair of the Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance practice group at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. The following post is based on a Gibson Dunn alert.

Amy Goodman is a partner and co-chair of the Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance practice group at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. The following post is based on a Gibson Dunn alert.

As companies prepare for the second year of filings under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) new conflict minerals rule, many companies are looking for guidance from the first annual filings, which were due June 2, 2014. As expected, the inaugural Form SD and conflict minerals report filings reflect diverse approaches to the new compliance and disclosure requirements. We offer below some observations based on the first round of conflict minerals filings for companies to consider as they address their compliance programs and disclosures for the 2014 calendar year. It is important to note, however, that the shape of future compliance and reporting obligations will be impacted by the outcome of the pending litigation challenging the conflict minerals rule, which also is discussed below, and any subsequent action by the SEC.

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Shareholder Proposals on Social and Environmental Issues

Matteo Tonello is managing director of corporate leadership at The Conference Board. This post relates to an issue of The Conference Board’s Director Notes series authored by Melissa Aguilar and Thomas Singer. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

Matteo Tonello is managing director of corporate leadership at The Conference Board. This post relates to an issue of The Conference Board’s Director Notes series authored by Melissa Aguilar and Thomas Singer. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

Political spending and climate change, key topics during the 2014 proxy season, are expected to feature heavily again in 2015 shareholder proposals. This post reviews the content of the social and environmental proposals voted on most frequently by shareholders of Russell 3000 companies during the 2014 season, including the topics that received the highest average shareholder support. The complete publication provides examples of proposal text and sponsor supporting statements, as well as board responses and related corporate disclosure.

Nearly 40 percent of all shareholder proposals submitted at Russell 3000 companies that held meetings during the first half of 2014 were related to social and environmental policy issues, up from 29.2 percent in 2010, as documented in Proxy Voting Analytics (2010-2014). Social and environmental policy proposals now represent the second-largest category of the subjects in terms of both the number submitted and the number voted, narrowly behind corporate governance.

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ESG Risks and Opportunities Facing Investee Companies

The following post comes to us from Rakhi Kumar, Head of Corporate Governance at State Street Global Advisors, and is based on an SSgA publication; the complete publication is available here.

The following post comes to us from Rakhi Kumar, Head of Corporate Governance at State Street Global Advisors, and is based on an SSgA publication; the complete publication is available here.

As part of our active ownership process, State Street Global Advisors (“SSgA”) considers environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) matters while evaluating and engaging with investee companies. SSgA believes that ESG factors can impact the reputation of companies and can also create significant operational risks and costs to businesses. Conversely, well-developed corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) programs [1] can generate efficiencies, enhance productivity and mitigate risks, all of which impact shareholder value.

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Making It Easier for Directors To “Do The Right Thing”

The following post is based on a recent Harvard Business Law Review article by Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. The article, Making It Easier For Directors To “Do The Right Thing”, is available here. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The following post is based on a recent Harvard Business Law Review article by Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. The article, Making It Easier For Directors To “Do The Right Thing”, is available here. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, and the Austin Wakeman Scott Lecturer on Law and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance, has recently published an article in the Harvard Business Law Review. The essay, titled Making It Easier For Directors To “Do The Right Thing”, is available here. The essay posits that benefit corporation statutes have the potential to change the accountability structure within which managers operate and thus create incremental reform that puts actual power behind the idea that corporations should “do the right thing.”

The abstract of Chief Justice Strine’s essay summarizes it briefly as follows:

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Nanotechnology and the S&P 500

The following post comes to us from Heidi Welsh, Executive Director at the Sustainable Investments Institute (Si2), and is based on a Si2 report.

The following post comes to us from Heidi Welsh, Executive Director at the Sustainable Investments Institute (Si2), and is based on a Si2 report.

Corporations globally have been investing $9 billion annually in nanotechnology, yet less than one-tenth of S&P 500 companies report to shareholders and other stakeholders on their involvement in nanotechnology. Although it has the potential to revolutionize industries like healthcare, information technology and energy systems, nanotechnology’s promise is tethered to unique environmental, health and safety (EH&S) issues that are not yet fully understood. Investors eyeing rapid growth and minimal regulation are engaging companies in discussions about nano-related EHS risks and recently forced a vote on the first nano-related shareholder resolution.

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Radical Shareholder Primacy

The following post comes to us from David Millon, the J.B. Stombock Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University.

The following post comes to us from David Millon, the J.B. Stombock Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University.

My article, Radical Shareholder Primacy, written for a symposium on the history of corporate social responsibility, seeks to make sense of the surprising disagreement within the corporate law academy on the foundational legal question of corporate purpose: does the law require shareholder primacy or not? I argue that disagreement on this question is due to an unappreciated ambiguity in the shareholder primacy idea. I identify two models of shareholder primacy, the “radical” and the “traditional.” Radical shareholder primacy makes strong claims about both shareholder governance rights, conceiving of management as the shareholders’ agent, and also about corporate purpose, insisting that corporate law mandates shareholder wealth maximization. Because there is no legal basis for either of these claims, those who deny that shareholder primacy is the law are correct at least as to this model. However, the traditional version of shareholder primacy accords to shareholders a special place in the corporation’s governance structure vis-à-vis the corporation’s nonshareholder stakeholders, for example, with respect to voting rights and the right to bring derivative suits. Beyond this privileged position in the horizontal dimension, there is no maximization mandate and corporate law does very little to provide shareholders with the tools necessary to exercise governance powers; there is no primacy in the vertical dimension or on the question of corporate purpose. Nevertheless, this conception of shareholder primacy—modest as it is—is enshrined in corporate law. Those who deny that shareholder primacy is the law need to acknowledge this fact, but once it is understood that traditional shareholder primacy has little in common with the radical version there is no reason to be reluctant to do so.

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