Tag: Firm valuation

Brain Drain or Brain Gain? Evidence from Corporate Boards

Mariassunta Giannetti is Professor of Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics. This post is based on an article by Professor Giannetti; Guanmin Liao, Associate Professor of Accounting at the School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics; and Xiaoyun Yu, Associate Professor of Finance at Indiana University, Bloomington.

Development economists have long warned about the costs for developing countries of the emigration of the best and brightest that decamp to universities and businesses in the developed world (Bhagwati, 1976). While this brain drain has attracted a considerable amount of economic research, more recently, arguments have been raised that the emigration of the brightest may actually benefit developing countries, because emigrants may eventually return with more knowledge and organizational skills. (See The Economist, May 26, 2011.) Thus, the brain drain may actually become a brain gain.

In our paper, Brain Drain or Brain Gain? Evidence from Corporate Boards, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, we demonstrate a specific channel through which the brain gain arising from return migration to emerging markets may benefit the overall economy: the brain gain in the corporate boards of publicly listed companies. Specifically, we highlight the effects of individuals with foreign experience joining the boards of directors on firms’ performance and corporate policies in China.


The Importance of Merger Price and Process in Delaware Appraisal Actions

Jason M. Halper is partner in the Securities Litigation & Regulatory Enforcement Practice Group at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. This post is based on an Orrick publication by Mr. Halper and Gregory Beaman. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

On April 30, 2015, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a post-trial opinion in which it rejected an attempt by dissenting shareholders to extract extra consideration for their shares above the merger price through appraisal rights. See Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., Slip. Op. Apr. 30, 2015, Case No. 8509-VCN (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015). Vice Chancellor Noble’s decision in AutoInfo offers important lessons for companies, directors and their counsel when considering strategic transactions and/or defending against claims that they agreed to sell the company at an inadequate price. AutoInfo reaffirms that a negotiated merger price can be the most reliable indicator of value when it is the product of a fair and adequate process.


More than 300 Research Papers Have Applied the Entrenchment Index of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009)

This post relates to an article by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrel, What Matters in Corporate Governance, available here and discussed on the Forum here. Lucian Bebchuk is William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School. Alma Cohen is Professor of Empirical Practice, Harvard Law School. Allen Ferrell is Greenfield Professor of Securities Law, Harvard Law School.

As of May 2015, more than 300 research studies have applied the Entrenchment Index put forward in a study published by Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance. The papers using the Entrenchment Index, including many papers in leading journals in law, economics and finance, are listed here.

The Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell paper, first circulated in 2004 and published in 2009 in the Review of Financial Studies, identified six corporate governance provisions as especially important, demonstrated empirically the significance of these provisions for firm valuation and put forward a governance index, commonly referred to as the “Entrenchment Index,” based on these six provisions. The paper has been cited by more than 650 research studies, and more than 300 of these studies made use of the index in their own empirical analysis.

The Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell paper putting forward the Entrenchment Index is available for download here.

Over-Reaction to Use of Merger Price to Determine Fair Value

Philip Richter is co-head of the Mergers and Acquisitions Practice at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank publication authored by Mr. Richter, Steven Epstein, John E. Sorkin, and Gail Weinstein. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The Delaware Chancery Court has used the merger price in the underlying transaction as the primary or sole factor in determining the “fair value” of dissenting shares in two recent appraisal cases. The Delaware Supreme Court recently upheld one of those decisions. However, the court’s use of the merger price in both cases was based on the same limited fact situation, suggesting that—contrary to much of the recent commentary—the merger price will not frequently be used as a key factor in determining fair value in appraisal cases.


Crossing State Lines Again—Appraisal Rights Outside of Delaware

Daniel Wolf is a partner at Kirkland & Ellis focusing on mergers and acquisitions. The following post is based on a Kirkland memorandum by Mr. Wolf, Matthew Solum, David B. Feirstein, and Laura A. Sullivan. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Even as the Delaware appraisal rights landscape continues to evolve, dealmakers should not assume that the issues and outcomes will be the same in transactions involving companies incorporated in other states. Although once an afterthought on the M&A landscape, in recent years appraisal rights have become a prominent topic of discussion among dealmakers. In an earlier M&A Update (discussed on the Forum here) we discussed a number of factors driving the recent uptick in shareholders exercising statutory appraisal remedies available in cash-out mergers. With the recent Delaware Supreme Court decision in CKx and Chancery Court opinion in Ancestry.com, both determining that the deal price was the best measure of fair price for appraisal purposes, and the upcoming appraisal trials for the Dell and Dole going-private transactions, the contours of the modern appraisal remedy, and the future prospects of the appraisal arbitrage strategy, are being decided in real-time. These and almost all of the other recent high-profile appraisal claims have one thing in common—the targets in question were all Delaware corporations and the parties have the benefit of a well-known statutory scheme and experienced judges relying on extensive (but evolving) case law. But, what if the target is not in Delaware?


Limited Commitment and the Financial Value of Corporate Law

The following post comes to us from Martijn Cremers, Professor of Finance at the University of Notre Dame, and Simone Sepe of the College of Law at the University of Arizona. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

For at least 40 years, a large body of literature has debated the effects of state competition for corporate charters and the value of state corporate laws. The common assumption of these studies is that interstate competition affects the way state corporate laws respond to managerial moral hazard, i.e., the agency problem arising between shareholders and managers out of the separation of ownership from control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Nevertheless, scholars have been sharply divided about the importance of interstate competition, and particularly whether interstate competition fosters a “race to the top” that maximizes firm value (Winter, 1977; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Romano, 1985, 1993) or a “race to the bottom” that pushes states to cater to managers at the expense of shareholders (Cary, 1974; Bebchuk, 1992; Bebchuk and Ferrell, 1999, 2001).


Tying Incentives of Executives to Long-Term Value Creation

Joseph Bachelder is special counsel in the Tax, Employee Benefits & Private Clients practice group at McCarter & English, LLP. The following post is based on an article by Mr. Bachelder, with assistance from Andy Tsang, which first appeared in the New York Law Journal. Research from the Program on Corporate Governance on long-term incentive pay includes Paying for Long-Term Performance by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here).

There is an important difference between the price paid for a business enterprise and the intrinsic value of that enterprise. As Benjamin Graham said, “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” Warren Buffett has made himself and many others wealthy by understanding this difference and making investments accordingly.

Part I of this post looks briefly at the intrinsic value versus the market price (sometimes the latter is referred to as market value or market cap) of a publicly traded corporation. Part II looks at current design of long-term incentives awarded to the management of such corporations. These awards tend to be tied to short-term increase in the market price of the corporation’s stock. Part III suggests a way in which long-term incentive awards might be tied more to generators of long-term value of the corporations awarding them.


A Strong Cautionary Note for M&A Practitioners and Professionals

Jack B. Jacobs is Senior Counsel at Sidley Austin LLP, and a former justice of the Delaware Supreme Court. The following post is based on a Sidley update, and is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

The volume of Court of Chancery decisions has been proceeding apace. We have culled out two that we believe are worthy of your attention:

Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Audax Health Solutions, 2014 WL 6784491 (Del. Ch.).

This is a “must read” for all M&A and Private Equity practitioners and professionals, given the use of certain of the deal devices found to be invalid in the specific circumstances of this case.

Cigna, a large stockholder of Audax, the acquired company, sued to invalidate certain conditions of an arm’s length negotiated cash-out merger of Audax into United. Essentially, the defendant merging corporations conditioned receipt of the merger consideration not only upon surrender of the (to-be-cancelled) shares, but also upon the execution of a Letter of Transmittal, wherein each surrendering stockholder agreed to the “Obligations” set forth therein. Cigna refused to execute a Letter of Transmittal, and in response the defendants refused to pay Cigna the merger consideration. Cigna sued in the Court of Chancery for a judgment declaring the Obligations invalid and mandating payment of the merger consideration to Cigna. The Court of Chancery (V.C. Parsons) held the obligations invalid under 8 Del. C. §251 and (relatedly) for lack of consideration.


Buybacks Around the World

The following post comes to us from Alberto Manconi of the Department of Finance at Tilburg University and Urs Peyer and Theo Vermaelen, both of the Finance Area at INSEAD.

Due to regulatory changes, share repurchases have become increasingly common around the world in the last 15 years. As such, in our paper, Buybacks Around the World, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we first examine whether the findings based on U.S. data hold up in an international setting, and whether examining non-U.S. data can change the way we think about buybacks. Second, we examine whether the original concerns about managers using buybacks to prop up the share price were somewhat warranted in countries outside the U.S.


Corporate Governance and the Creation of the SEC

The following post comes to us from Arevik Avedian of Harvard Law School; Henrik Cronqvist, Professor of Finance from China Europe International Business School (CEIBS); and Marc Weidenmier, Professor of Economics at Claremont Colleges.

Severe turmoil in financial markets—whether the Panic of 1826, the Wall Street Crash of 1929, or the Global Financial Crisis of 2008—often raises significant concerns about the effectiveness of pre-existing securities market regulation. In turn, such concerns tend to result in calls for more and stricter government regulation of corporations and financial markets. It is widely considered that the most significant change to U.S. financial regulation in the past 100 years was the Securities Act of 1933 and the subsequent creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce it. Before the SEC creation, federal securities market regulation was essentially absent in the U.S. In our paper, Corporate Governance and the Creation of the SEC, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine how companies listing in the U.S. responded to this significant increase in the provision of government-sponsored corporate governance. Specifically, did this landmark legislation have any significant effects on board governance (e.g., the independence of boards) and firm valuations?


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  • Programs Faculty & Senior Fellows

    Lucian Bebchuk
    Alon Brav
    Robert Charles Clark
    John Coates
    Alma Cohen
    Stephen M. Davis
    Allen Ferrell
    Jesse Fried
    Oliver Hart
    Ben W. Heineman, Jr.
    Scott Hirst
    Howell Jackson
    Robert J. Jackson, Jr.
    Wei Jiang
    Reinier Kraakman
    Robert Pozen
    Mark Ramseyer
    Mark Roe
    Robert Sitkoff
    Holger Spamann
    Guhan Subramanian

  • Program on Corporate Governance Advisory Board

    William Ackman
    Peter Atkins
    Joseph Bachelder
    John Bader
    Allison Bennington
    Richard Breeden
    Daniel Burch
    Richard Climan
    Jesse Cohn
    Isaac Corré
    Scott Davis
    John Finley
    Daniel Fischel
    Stephen Fraidin
    Byron Georgiou
    Larry Hamdan
    Carl Icahn
    David Millstone
    Theodore Mirvis
    James Morphy
    Toby Myerson
    Barry Rosenstein
    Paul Rowe
    Rodman Ward