Tag: Information asymmetries

13(d) Reporting Inadequacies in an Era of Speed and Innovation

David A. Katz is a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz specializing in the areas of mergers and acquisitions and complex securities transactions. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton publication by Mr. Katz and Laura A. McIntosh. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here); and Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.

The Securities and Exchange Commission and other market regulators confront a challenging issue: How to effectively monitor and regulate activity in an environment that is both fast-moving and highly complex? The principles and architecture of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were created for a much simpler financial world—an analog world—and they struggle to describe and contain the digital world of today. The lightning speed of information flow and trading, the constant innovations in financial products, and the increasing sophistication of active market participants each pose enormous challenges for the SEC; together, even more so. The ongoing controversy over Section 13(d) reporting exemplifies the many challenges facing the SEC in this regard.


Regulating Trading Practices

Andreas M. Fleckner is a Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg. This post is based on a chapter prepared for The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (forthcoming).

High-frequency trading, dark pools, front-running, phantom orders, short selling—the way securities are traded ranks high among today’s regulatory challenges. Thanks to a steady stream of news reports, investor complaints, and public investigations, it has become commonplace to call for the government to intervene and impose order. The regulation of trading practices, one of the oldest roots of securities law and still a regulatory mystery to many people, is suddenly the talk of the town.

From a historical and empirical perspective, however, many of the recent developments look less dramatic than some observers believe. This is the essence of Regulating Trading Practices, my chapter for the new Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation. The chapter explains how today’s regulatory regime evolved, identifies the key rationale for governments to intervene, and analyzes the rules, regulators, and techniques of the world’s leading jurisdictions. My central argument is that governments should focus on the price formation process and ensure that it is purely market-driven. Local regulators and self-regulatory organizations will take care of the rest.


Delaware Court Imposes Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duties

Ariel J. Deckelbaum is a partner and deputy chair of the Corporate Department at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum by Mr. Deckelbaum, Justin G. Hamill, Stephen P. Lamb, Jeffrey D. Marell, and Frances Mi. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

In In re Dole Food Co. Inc. Stockholder Litigation, in connection with a take-private transaction with the controlling stockholder, the Delaware Court of Chancery held in a post-trial opinion that the President of the company and its controlling stockholder undermined the sales process by depriving the special committee of the ability to negotiate on a fully informed basis and the stockholders of the ability to consider the merger on a fully informed basis. The court held that the President and the controlling stockholder intentionally acted in bad faith (with the President also engaging in fraud) and that they were jointly and severally liable for damages of $148,190,590. Because fiduciary breaches of this nature are not exculpable or indemnifiable under Delaware law, the controlling stockholder and the President are personally liable for the damages imposed.


Corporate Use of Social Media

James Naughton is Assistant Professor of Accounting at Northwestern University. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Naughton; Michael Jung, Assistant Professor of Accounting at New York University; Ahmed Tahoun, Assistant Professor of Accounting at London Business School; and Clare Wang, Assistant Professor of Accounting at Northwestern University.

Social media has transformed communications in many sectors of the U.S. economy. It is now used for disaster preparation and emergency response, security at major events, and public agencies are researching new uses in geolocation, law enforcement, court decisions, and military intelligence. Internationally, social media is credited for organizing political protests across the Middle East and a revolution in Egypt. In the business world, social media is considered a revolutionary sales and marketing platform and a powerful recruiting and networking channel. Little research exists, however, on how firms use social media to communicate financial information to investors and how investors respond to investor disseminated through social media, despite firms devoting considerable effort to creating and managing social media presences directed at investors. Motivated by this lack of research, in our paper, Corporate Use of Social Media, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we provide early large-sample evidence on the corporate use of social media for investor communications. More specifically, we investigate why firms choose to disseminate investor communications through social media, whether investors and traditional media outlets respond to social media disclosures, and whether potential adverse consequences to the firm exist from the use of social media to disseminate investor communications.


Price Impact in Securities Class Actions Post-Halliburton II

Jorge Baez and Dr. Renzo Comolli are Senior Consultants at NERA Economic Consulting. This post is based on a NERA publication authored by Mr. Baez and Dr. Comolli. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Rethinking Basic by Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell (discussed on the Forum here).

On July 25, 2015, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued the much-anticipated ruling on class certification in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. The economic analysis of price impact was front and center in the Court’s ruling.

This ruling follows the Supreme Court’s decision on price impact that is widely known as Halliburton II. Although this ruling involves facts that are unique to Halliburton’s particular disclosures, attorneys may look at it as a roadmap for guiding economic analysis of price impact in future cases in the post-Halliburton II world.


Prices and Informed Trading

Vyacheslav Fos is Assistant Professor of Finance at Boston College. This post is based on an article by Professor Fos and Pierre Collin-Dufresne, Professor of Finance at the Swiss Finance Institute. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang; and The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here).

In our paper, Do Prices Reveal the Presence of Informed Trading?, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, we study how empirical measures of stock illiquidity and of adverse selection respond to informed trading by activist shareholders.

An extensive body of theory suggests that stock illiquidity, as measured by the bid-ask spread and by the price impact of trades, should be increasing in the information asymmetry between market participants. An extensive empirical literature employing these illiquidity measures thus assumes that they capture information asymmetry. But, do these empirical measures of adverse selection actually increase with information asymmetry? To test this question one would ideally separate informed from uninformed trades ex-ante and measure their relative impact on price changes. However, since we generally do not know the traders’ information sets, this is hard to do in practice.


Timing Stock Trades for Personal Gain: Private Information and Sales of Shares by CEOs

Robert Parrino is Professor of Finance at the University of Texas at Austin. This post is based on an article by Professor Parrino; Eliezer Fich, Associate Professor of Finance at Drexel University; and Anh Tran, Senior Lecturer in Finance at City University London. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Insider Trading via the Corporation by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum here), Paying for Long-Term Performance (discussed on the Forum here) and the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, both by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

In October 2000, the SEC enacted Rule 10b5-1 which enables managers to reduce their exposure to allegations of trading on material non-public information by announcing pre-planned stock sales up to two years in advance. In our paper, Timing Stock Trades for Personal Gain: Private Information and Sales of Shares by CEOs, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine the impact of Rule 10b5-1 on the gains that CEOs earn when they sell large blocks of stock.


What the Allergan/Valeant Story Teaches About Staggered Boards 

Arnold Pinkston is former General Counsel at Allergan, Inc. and Beckman Coulter, Inc. This post comments on the work of institutional investors working with the Shareholder Rights Project, (discussed on the Forum here, here, and here) which successfully advocated for board declassification in about 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies.

Until March 2015, I was the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Allergan, Inc. For much of 2014 my job was to address the hostile bid launched by Valeant and Pershing Square to acquire Allergan.

With that perspective, I followed with interest the debate surrounding staggered boards, and in particular the success of institutional investors working with the Shareholder Rights Project in bringing about board declassification in over 100 S&P 500 and Fortune 500 companies. From my perspective, the debate did not seem to fully reflect the complexity of the relationship between a company and its shareholders—i) that each company and each set of shareholders is unique; ii) that destaggering a board can affect the value of companies positively, negatively or hardly at all; and iii) that shareholders, each from their own unique perspective, will be searching for factors that will determine whether annual elections are in their own best interests—not the company’s. For that reason, I respectfully offer my thoughts regarding the campaign to destagger boards.


Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms

The following post comes to us from Henry T. C. Hu, Allan Shivers Chair in the Law of Banking and Finance at the University of Texas School of Law.

Financial innovation has fundamental implications for the key substantive and information-based mechanisms of corporate governance. My new article, Financial Innovation and Governance Mechanisms: The Evolution of Decoupling and Transparency (forthcoming in Business Lawyer, Spring 2015) focuses on two phenomena: “decoupling” (e.g., “empty voting,” “empty crediting,” and “hidden [morphable] ownership”) and the structural transparency challenges posed by financial innovation (and by the primary governmental response to such challenges). In decoupling, much has happened since the 2006-2008 series of sole- and co-authored articles (generally with Bernard Black and one with Jay Westbrook) developed and refined the pertinent analytical framework. In transparency, the analytical framework for “information,” developed and refined in 2012-2014, can contribute not only to the comprehensive new SEC “disclosure effectiveness” initiative but also to resolving complications arising from the creation of a new parallel public disclosure system—the first new system since the creation of the SEC.


The Governance Effect of the Media’s News Dissemination Role

The following post comes to us from Lili Dai of the College of Business and Economics at Australian National University; Jerry Parwada and Bohui Zhang, both of the Finance Area at UNSW Australia.

That the media plays a role in corporate governance is well known. What is less clear is how the governance effect of the media works. Existing evidence supports the notion that the media disciplines managers by creating content that exposes governance problems. In our paper, The Governance Effect of the Media’s News Dissemination Role: Evidence from Insider Trading, forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting Research, we use evidence from a large sample of insider trading filings to investigate whether the media’s news dissemination role directly affects governance.

The SEC requires insiders to report their trading activities on Form 4 filings, which are typically disseminated through the media. This setting provides us with a useful opportunity to examine the effect of the media’s dissemination role on corporate governance, and specifically in restricting insiders’ trading profits. Since news dissemination increases the breadth of coverage and the attention of investors through repetition, we conjecture that the media reduces the profitability of insiders’ future transactions by disseminating regulatory releases of prior insider trading activities. We call this view, which forms our main hypothesis, disciplining via dissemination.


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