Tag: Innovation

Corporate Venture Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation

The following post comes to us from Thomas Chemmanur, Professor of Finance at Boston College; Elena Loutskina of the Finance Area at the University of Virginia; and Xuan Tian of the Finance Department at Indiana University.

There is no doubt that innovation is a critical driver of a nation’s long-term economic growth and competitive advantage. The question lies, however, in identifying the optimal organizational form for nurturing innovation. While corporate research laboratories account for two-thirds of all U.S. research, it is not obvious that these innovation incubators are more efficient than independent investors such as venture capitalists. In our paper, Corporate Venture Capital, Value Creation, and Innovation, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we explore this question by comparing the innovation productivity of entrepreneurial firms backed by corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) and independent venture capitalists (IVCs).


Financial Dependence and Innovation

The following post comes to us from Viral Acharya, Professor of Finance at NYU, and Zhaoxia Xu of the Department of Finance and Risk Engineering at NYU.

While innovation is crucial for businesses to gain strategic advantage over competitors, financing innovation tends to be difficult because of uncertainty and information asymmetry associated with innovative activities (Hall and Lerner (2010)). Firms with innovative opportunities often lack capital. Stock markets can provide various benefits as a source of external capital by reducing asymmetric information, lowering the cost of capital, as well as enabling innovation in firms (Rajan (2012)). Given the increasing dependence of young firms on public equity to finance their R&D (Brown et al. (2009)), understanding the relation between innovation and a firm’s financial dependence is a vital but under-explored research question. In our paper, Financial Dependence and Innovation: The Case of Public versus Private Firms, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we fill this gap in the literature by investigating how innovation depends on the access to stock market financing and the need for external capital.


Corporate Takeovers and Economic Efficiency

The following post comes to us from B. Espen Eckbo, Professor of Finance at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College.

In the paper, Corporate Takeovers and Economic Efficiency, written for the Annual Review of Financial Economics, I review recent takeover research which advances our understanding of the role of M&A in the drive for productive efficiency. Much of this research places takeovers in the context of industrial organization, tracing with unprecedented level of detail “who buys who” up and down the supply chain and within industrial networks. I also review recent research testing the rationality of the bidding process, including whether the sales mechanism promotes a transfer of control of the target resources to the most efficient buyer. This literature draws on auction theory to describe optimal bidding strategies and it uses sophisticated econometric techniques to generate counterfactuals, exogenous variation, and causality. The review is necessarily selective, with an emphasis on the most recent contributions: half of the referenced articles were drafted or published within the past five years.


The New Financial Industry

The following post comes to us from Tom C.W. Lin of Temple Law School.

The recent discussions surrounding Michael Lewis’s new book, Flash Boys, revealed a profound and uncomfortable truth about modern finance to the public and policymakers: Machines are taking over Wall Street. Artificial intelligence, mathematical models, and supercomputers have replaced human intelligence, human deliberation, and human execution in many aspects of finance. The modern financial industry is becoming faster, larger, more complex, more global, more interconnected, and less human. An industry once dominated by humans has evolved into one where humans and machines share dominion.


Motivating Innovation in Newly Public Firms

The following post comes to us from Nina Baranchuk and Robert Kieschnick, both of the Finance and Managerial Economics Area at the University of Texas at Dallas, and Rabih Moussawi of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.

How do shareholders motivate managers to pursue innovations that result in patents when substantial potential costs exist to managers who do so? This question has taken on special importance as promoting these kinds of innovations has become a critical element of not only the competition between companies, but also the competition between nations. In our paper, Motivating Innovation in Newly Public Firms, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we address this question by providing empirical tests of predictions arising from recent theoretical studies of this issue.


The Impact of Venture Capital Monitoring

The following post comes to us from Shai Bernstein of the Finance Area at Stanford University, Xavier Giroud of the Finance Group at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Richard Townsend of the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College.

It is often argued that venture capital (VC) plays an important role in promoting innovation and growth. Consistent with this belief, governments around the world have pursued a number of policies aimed at fostering local venture capital activity. The goal of these policies has been to replicate the success of regions like Silicon Valley in the United States. However, there remains scarce evidence that the activities of venture capitalists actually play a causal role in stimulating the creation of innovative and successful companies. Indeed, venture capitalists may simply select companies that are poised to innovate and succeed, even absent their involvement. In this case, efforts by policy-makers to foster local venture capital activity would be misguided. In our paper, The Impact of Venture Capital Monitoring: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine whether the activities of venture capitalists do indeed affect portfolio company outcomes.


Firm Boundaries Matter

The following post comes to us from Amit Seru, Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago.

Do firm boundaries affect the allocation of resources? This question had spawned significant research in economics since it was raised in Coase (1937). A large body of work has focused on comparing the resource allocation in conglomerates relative to stand-alone firms to shed light on this issue. Theoretically, there are competing views on this aspect. On the one hand, Alchian (1969), Wiliamson (1985), and Stein (1997), among others, have put forth the view that conglomerates, by virtue of exerting centralized control over the capital allocation process, may do a better job in directing investments than the external capital markets. On the other hand, the “dark side” view of internal capital markets argues that problems of corporate socialism are more prevalent in conglomerates making them less efficient in resource allocation (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).


Understanding the Board of Directors after the Financial Crisis

The following post comes to us from Joseph A. McCahery and Erik P. M. Vermeulen, both of Tilburg University Law School.

Research on the composition and structure of the board of directors is a thriving subject in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The discussion thus far has assumed that finding the right board members is extremely important because they tend to enhance corporate strategy and decision-making. Consider the case of Apple’s board. Following Steve Jobs’ return to the firm in 1997, he understood well the important role of the board of directors to both improve company productivity and build relationships with its suppliers and customers. In order for the board of directors to become a competitive advantage and help carry Apple forward, its members needed to have a thorough understanding of the computer industry and the firm’s products. Accordingly, a change in the composition of the board of directors was arguably a necessary first step to bring back focus, relevance and interaction (with the outside world) to the company in its journey to introduce disruptive innovations and creative products to its customers. The result was impressive: Between August 6th, 1997 (the day the “new” board was introduced) and August 23rd, 2011 (the last day of Jobs as the CEO of Apple), the stock price soared from $25.25 to $360.30, increasing 1,327 per cent.


Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions

The following post comes to us from Jan Bena and Kai Li, both of the Finance Division at the University of British Columbia.

It has long been argued that synergies are key drivers of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and that many M&As occur due to technology reasons. However, there is little direct evidence of whether and how synergies in the technology space drive individual firms’ decisions to participate in M&As, and of how they affect merger outcomes. In our paper, Corporate Innovations and Mergers and Acquisitions, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, we first examine the relation between characteristics of corporate innovation activities and whether a firm becomes an acquirer or a target firm. We then study whether technological overlap between firm pairs affects transaction incidence. Finally, using a sample of bids withdrawn due to reasons exogenous to innovation as a control sample, we estimate the effect of a merger on future innovation output when there is pre-merger technological overlap between merging firms. Our large and unique patent-merger data set over the period 1984 to 2006 allows us to construct targeted measures of innovation output and technological overlap, extending the analysis of Hoberg and Phillips (2010) in product markets.


The Sustainability Business Case

Matteo Tonello is managing director at The Conference Board. This post relates to an issue of The Conference Board’s Director Notes series authored by Marc Bertoneche and Cornis van der Lugt; the full publication, including footnotes, is available here.

While much has been published on the business case for sustainability during the last decade, businesses have been slow to adopt the green innovation and sustainability agenda. Reasons include a lack of consistency in the indicators employed by analysts, and a failure to effectively incorporate financial value drivers into the equation. This article defines a green business case model that includes seven core financial value drivers of special interest to financial analysts.

Researchers, management experts, and activists have published extensively over the last decade on the business case for sustainability. The accumulated evidence and experience makes it clear that sustainability actions do not have a negative or neutral impact on the financial performance of a business. Rather, it is a question of the degree to which sustainability actions have a positive impact on financial performance. One research overview has identified more than 60 benefits, clustered into seven overall business benefit areas.

As greater attention is paid today to integrated thinking and more sustainable business models, the link between sustainability actions and corporate financial performance remains central. However, the business case evidence collected to date has failed to have the expected scale of impact. One reason for this is the lack of consistency in indicators employed by analysts in their examination of possible cause and effect relations. Another is the gap in discipline between sustainability experts and financial officers, with each community conversing in its own language (jargon). Sustainability activists have failed to get a better grasp on corporate finance, while financial officers have failed to get a better grasp on the sustainability agenda.


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