Tag: Proxy disclosure

Exceptions to Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals Exclusion

David A. Katz is a partner specializing in the areas of mergers and acquisitions and complex securities transactions at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Katz and Sabastian V. Niles. Mr. Niles is counsel at Wachtell Lipton specializing in rapid response shareholder activism and preparedness, takeover defense, corporate governance, and M&A.

Yesterday [October 22, 2015], the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H. SLB14H formally narrows the long-standing approach to interpreting Rule 14a-8(i)(9), which permits a company to exclude a shareholder proposal that otherwise complies with Rule 14a-8 from its proxy statement “[i]f the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company’s own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting.”


“Pay Versus Performance” Rule Proposed by SEC Under Dodd-Frank

Joseph E. Bachelder is special counsel in the Tax, Employee Benefits & Private Clients practice group at McCarter & English, LLP. The following post is based on an article by Mr. Bachelder which first appeared in the New York Law Journal. Andy Tsang, a senior financial analyst with the firm, assisted in the preparation of this column. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance about CEO pay includes Paying for Long-Term Performance (discussed on the Forum here) and the book Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, both by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.


“We are drowning in information, while starving for wisdom.” —E.O. Wilson [1]

On April 29, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced its proposal to add a new Item 402(v), captioned “Pay versus Performance,” to Regulation S-K. [2] The SEC announced the proposed rule pursuant to Dodd-Frank Section 953(a). [3] Section 953(a) directs the SEC to adopt rules requiring that proxy statements and certain “consent solicitation material” [4] provide “information that shows the relationship between executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the issuer, taking into account any change in the value of the shares of stock and dividends of the registrant and any distributions.” This is in addition to information already provided under Item 402 of Regulation S-K.

SEC Seeks Input on Enhanced Disclosures for Audit Committees

Michael J. Scanlon is a partner and member of the Securities Regulation and Corporate Governance practice group at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. This post is based on a Gibson Dunn alert.

At an open meeting held on July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued a concept release addressing the prospect of enhanced disclosures for audit committees. The much-publicized concept release is available here and requests comment on a number of possible changes to existing SEC disclosure requirements about the work of audit committees, focusing in particular on audit committees’ selection and oversight of independent auditors. The SEC said that it has issued the release in response to views expressed by some that current disclosures may not provide investors with sufficient information about what audit committees do and how they perform their duties. The release seeks feedback on whether certain audit committee disclosures should be added, removed or modified to provide additional meaningful disclosures to investors.


Latest CD&A Template Offers Best Practices, Is Win-Win for Issuers, Investors

Matt Orsagh is a director at CFA Institute.

To help companies produce a more clear and concise executive compensation report that attends to the needs of both companies and investors, CFA Institute has released an updated Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A) Template. It is an update of the 2011 template of the same name and aims to help companies draft CD&As that serve as better communications tools, not simply as compliance documents.

CFA Institute worked with issuers, investors, proxy advisers, compensation consultants, legal experts and other associations to update the manual so it would best serve the needs of investors and issuers. One of the main enhancements in the latest version of the template is a graphic executive summary that presents the main information investors are looking for in a concise format that takes up only one or two pages.


Optimizing Proxy Communications

The following post comes to us from Ernst & Young LLP, and is based on a publication by the EY Center for Board Matters.

Proxy statements continue to evolve. New disclosure trends are sharpening company messaging to investors, while other disclosure practices leave investors seeking clarification.

To learn what kinds of disclosures are most valuable to investors, EY asked them where they would like to see disclosure enhancements and the kinds of disclosure practices they prefer.

The EY Center for Board Matters recently had conversations with 50 institutional investors, investor associations and advisors on their corporate governance views and priorities.

This post is the third in a series of four posts based on insights gathered from those conversations and previewing the 2015 proxy season. The first post (available here) focused upon board composition; the second (available here) upon shareholder activism. The upcoming final post will focus on the shareholder proposal landscape.


SEC Proposes Proxy Disclosure Rules for Hedging by Directors, Officers and Employees

Steven Rosenblum is a partner in the Corporate Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz client memorandum by Mr. Rosenblum, Andrew R. Brownstein, and Sabastian V. Niles.

Pursuant to Section 955 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC on February 9, 2015 proposed hedging disclosure rules for public comment and review. These rules, if adopted, would require proxy statements involving the election of directors to disclose whether the company permits employees (including officers), members of the board of directors or their designees to engage in transactions to hedge or offset any decrease in the market value of equity securities that are granted to the employee or board member as compensation or otherwise held, directly or indirectly, by the employee or board member, regardless of source.


Preparing for the 2015 Proxy Season

The following post comes to us from Lawrence R. Hamilton, partner in the Corporate & Securities practice at Mayer Brown LLP, and is based on a Mayer Brown Legal Update. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

It is time for calendar year-end public companies to focus on the upcoming 2015 proxy and annual reporting season. This post discusses the following key issues for companies to consider in their preparations:

  • Pending Dodd-Frank Regulation
  • Say-on-Pay and Compensation Disclosure Considerations
  • Shareholder Proposals
  • Proxy Access
  • Compensation Committee Independence Determinations
  • Compensation Adviser Independence Assessment
  • Compensation Consultant Conflict of Interest Disclosure
  • NYSE Quorum Requirement Change
  • Director and Officer Questionnaires
  • Proxy Advisory Firm and Investment Adviser Matters
  • Conflict Minerals
  • Cybersecurity
  • Management’s Discussion and Analysis
  • XBRL
  • Proxy Bundling
  • Foreign Issuer Preliminary Proxy Statement Relief
  • Technology and the Proxy Season


Audit Committee Reporting To Shareholders: 2014 Proxy Season Update

The following post comes to us from Ernst & Young, and is based on an Ernst & Young study by Allie M. Rutherford and Ruby Sharma. The complete publication is available here.

The 2014 proxy season saw significant growth in audit committee transparency. Continuing the trend of the past several years, an increased number of Fortune 100 companies are going beyond the minimum disclosures required.

These disclosures are also more robust—providing valuable perspectives on the activities of audit committees, including their oversight of external auditors.

The recent movement toward increased audit committee transparency has been encouraged by a variety of factors and entities. In addition to the ongoing disclosure effectiveness review by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) involving a holistic review of the US corporate disclosure regime, audit committee disclosures are receiving significant attention from a variety of stakeholders. These stakeholders include US and non-US regulators, investors, and policy organizations.


Delaware Court Denies Attorneys’ Fees for Alleged Dodd-Frank Disclosure Deficiencies

The following post comes to us from Stewart D. Aaron, partner in the Securities Enforcement and Litigation practice at Arnold & Porter LLP, and is based on an Arnold & Porter publication by Mr. Aaron and Robert C. Azarow. This post is part of the Delaware law series, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available here.

Under Delaware’s corporate benefit doctrine, a stockholder who presents a meritorious claim to a board of directors may be entitled to attorneys’ fees if the stockholder’s efforts result in the conferring of a corporate benefit. [1] On June 20, 2014, the Delaware Chancery Court considered in Raul v. Astoria Financial Corporation [2] whether attorneys’ fees are warranted under this doctrine when a stockholder identifies potential deficiencies in executive compensation disclosures required by the SEC pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act “say on pay” provisions. [3] The court held that the alleged omissions at issue failed to demonstrate any breach of the Board of Directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law and accordingly the Plaintiff did not present a meritorious demand to the Board. This decision makes clear that the courts will not shift fees to a stockholder (and the stockholder’s law firm) who “has simply done the company a good turn by bringing to the attention of the board an action that it ultimately decides to take.” [4]


CII Urges SEC to Require Disclosure of Third-Party Director Compensation

Sabastian V. Niles is counsel in the Corporate Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, where he focuses on rapid response shareholder activism, takeover defense and corporate governance. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Niles, Trevor Norwitz, Andrew R. Brownstein, and David C. Karp.

As we have previously written, special compensation arrangements between public company directors and third parties, such as activist hedge funds or other nominating shareholders, pose serious threats to the integrity of boardroom decision-making and have been sharply criticized by commentators and many institutional shareholders. The Council of Institutional Investors (CII), which has previously declared that third-party director incentive schemes “blatantly contradict” CII policies on director compensation, has now taken the additional step of encouraging the SEC to act to ensure investors are fully informed about such arrangements between nominating shareholders and their director candidates.


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