Tag: SEC

The SEC’s Focus on Cybersecurity

Jessica Forbes is a corporate partner resident the New York office of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank publication authored by Ms. Forbes, Joanna D. Rosenberg, and Stacey Song.

On September 22, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) issued a cease-and-desist order (the “Order”) and settled charges against St. Louis-based investment adviser R.T. Jones Capital Equities Management (“R.T. Jones”) for failing to establish required policies and procedures to safeguard customer information in violation of Rule 30(a) of Regulation S-P (“Rule 30(a)”) under the Securities Act of 1933. [1]

Rule 30(a) requires every broker, dealer, investment company and registered investment adviser to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure the security and confidentiality of customer information and to protect customer information from anticipated threats or unauthorized access. According to the Order, from at least September 2009 through July 2013, R.T. Jones stored personal information of its clients and other persons on its third party-hosted web server without adopting any such written policies and procedures. In July 2013, a hacker gained access to the data on R.T. Jones’ web server, rendering the personal information of more than 100,000 individuals vulnerable to theft. In response to the cyber attack, R.T. Jones notified each individual whose information was compromised.


SCOTUS Declines Petition on Insider Trading Ruling

Brad S. Karp is chairman and partner at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul Weiss client memorandum.

Today [October 5, 2015], the United States Supreme Court declined to hear the petition for a writ of certiorari (the “Petition”) filed by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), a landmark decision that dismissed indictments against two insider trading defendants. By declining to hear the Petition, the Supreme Court ensured that the Second Circuit’s decision in Newman will remain binding in the Second Circuit and influential across the country.

As we explain below, two of Newman’s holdings are particularly important: first, that the government must prove that a remote tippee knew or should have known of the personal benefit received by a tipper in exchange for disclosing nonpublic information; and second, that the benefits alleged by the government in United States v. Newman were not sufficient to support a conviction, as they were not sufficiently “consequential.”


Will a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Bring Peace?

Martin Lipton is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum here); The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum here); The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum here); and Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.

The decades-long conflict that is currently raging over short-termism and activist hedge funds strikes me as analogous to the Thirty Years’ War of the 17th Century, albeit fought with statistics (“empirical evidence”), op-eds and journal articles rather than cannon, pike and sword. I decided, after some thirty-six years in the front line of the army defending corporations and their boards, that pursuing the thought might result in an essay more interesting (and perhaps a bit more amusing) than my usual memos and articles.

In 1618, after two centuries of religious disputation and tenuous co-existence, the ascension of the staunchly partisan Ferdinand II as Holy Roman Emperor sparked a revolt that disrupted the balance of power in Europe and began the Thirty Years’ War. The War quickly involved the major powers of Europe. The conflict resulted in the Peace of Westphalia and the redrawing of the religious and political map of Europe, a new paradigm for the governance of Europe.

In 1985, a century of disputation as to the roles of professional management, boards of directors and shareholders of public companies similarly resulted in the disruption of the balance of power and general prosperity. In the two decades immediately preceding 1985, corporate raiders had perfected the front-end-loaded, two-tier, junk-bond-financed, bust-up tender offer, using tactics such as the “Highly Confident Letter” to launch a takeover without firm financing, “greenmail” (accumulating a block of stock and threatening a takeover bid unless the target company repurchases the block at a premium to the market) and litigation attacking protective state laws. Public companies did not have sufficient time or means to defend against corporate raiders. The battles culminated in two key 1985 decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court that restored the balance of power between boards of directors and opportunistic shareholders. In the Unocal case, the court upheld the power of the board of directors to reject, and take action to defeat, a hostile takeover bid, and in the Household case, it sustained the legality of the poison pill, which I had introduced three years earlier in an effort to level the playing field between corporate raiders and the companies they targeted.


SEC Interpretation of “Whistleblower” Definition

Nicholas S. Goldin is a partner at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher publication by Mr. Goldin, Peter H. BresnanYafit Cohn, and Mark J. Stein.

On August 4, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued an interpretive release to clarify its reading of the whistleblower rules it promulgated in 2011 under Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). The release expressed the SEC’s view that the employment retaliation protection accorded by the Dodd-Frank Act and codified in Section 21F is available to individuals who report the suspected securities law violation internally, rather than to the SEC. [1]


Asset Managers: AML ready?

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Jeff Lavine, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer. The complete publication, including footnotes and appendix, is available here.

On August 25th, the US Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposed anti-money laundering requirements for US investment advisers. The proposal requires advisers that are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish anti-money laundering (AML) programs, to report suspicious activities related to money laundering and terrorist financing, and to comply with other sections of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).

If finalized as proposed, the impact of these new requirements will vary. Advisers owned by bank holding companies (BHCs) are already subject to similar requirements that are applicable to their BHC parents and enforced by the Federal Reserve. These advisers will nevertheless likely experience an increase in regulatory oversight, as the proposal now allows the SEC to enforce AML requirements.


Remarks on Small and Emerging Companies

Mary Jo White is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on Chair White’s remarks at a recent open meeting of the SEC, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair White and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

As you know, the term of this Committee expires September 24, 2015. The advice and expertise the Committee has provided to the Commission on a variety of issues over the last four years has been incredibly helpful to us. And, as today’s [September 23, 2015] agenda reflects, you are continuing those contributions. Your contributions have shown the importance of this Committee, and I am pleased to announce that the Commission is renewing its charter for another two-year term. The Commission will be selecting members and it is my hope that many of you will continue your service. I look forward to our continuing dialogue and being the beneficiary of your insight and suggestions.


NYSE Expands Rules on Material News and Trading Halts

Stuart H. Gelfond is a partner in the Corporate Department at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank publication authored by Mr. Gelfond, Victoria D. Laubach, and Hayley S. Cohen.

Recently, the New York Stock Exchange LLC (“NYSE” or “Exchange”) filed a proposed rule change with the Securities and Exchange Commission to amend the NYSE Listed Company Manual (the “Manual”), effective September 28, 2015. [1] The proposed amendments (i) expand the pre-market hours during which companies with listed securities are required to notify the Exchange prior to disseminating material news, (ii) provide guidance related to the release of material news after the close of trading on the Exchange and (iii) permit the Exchange to halt trading in certain additional circumstances, including when it needs to obtain more information about a listed company’s news release.


Announcement of New Rulemaking Database

Mary Jo White is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on Chair White’s recent public statement, available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair White and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Strong regulations are central to the Commission’s mission. For more than 80 years, we have used rulemaking to establish a comprehensive framework for our securities markets that protects investors, enhances market integrity, and promotes capital formation. The rulemaking process is the means through which the Commission responds to the ever-changing securities markets, targets and attacks harmful practices in those markets, and meets the goals mandated by Congress. Our rules provide important standards against which we assess compliance in our examinations and hold wrongdoers accountable in our enforcement actions.


Opening Remarks at the 75th Anniversary of the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act

Mary Jo White is Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The following post is based on Chair White’s remarks on the 75th Anniversary of the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act. The full text, including footnotes, is available here. The views expressed in this post are those of Chair White and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Good morning. Thank you for coming today [September 29, 2015], and welcome to the SEC, both those here in person and through our webcast. Before I say anything else, I would like to acknowledge staff from the Division of Investment Management for their hard work in putting this anniversary program together. In particular, kudos go to Director Dave Grim, Jennifer McHugh, Bridget Farrell and Jamie Walter. I also would like to thank my fellow Commissioners who are introducing the panels, and all of the stellar panelists who will be sharing with us their insights throughout the day.

Today, we celebrate 75 years of the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act—two pieces of legislation that came to shape the financial markets as we know them. And this event is more than an anniversary celebration—it is a day to reflect on this extraordinary regulatory system that has facilitated the management and growth of assets for millions of Americans and other investors from around the world. In these opening remarks, my assignment is to first take us on a brief historical tour and then come back full circle to today where we see just how powerful and alive these Acts are in the modern markets.

The Importance of Being Earnest About Liquidity Risk Management

Luis A. Aguilar is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Commissioner Aguilar’s recent public statement at an open meeting of the SEC; the full text, including footnotes, is available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Aguilar and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

The fund industry has witnessed substantial changes in recent years, including the rise of novel investment strategies, a growing use of derivatives, and an increased focus on assets that, traditionally, have been less liquid. Unfortunately, it appears that not all funds’ liquidity risk management practices have kept pace with these developments.

Today [September 22, 2015], the Commission considers proposing a set of rules and amendments that will help ensure that open-end investment companies—which include mutual funds and exchange traded funds—manage their liquidity risks in a prudent and responsible manner. The proposed changes will also help attenuate the dilution risks that confront long-term shareholders, and will give investors needed tools to monitor how well funds are managing their liquidity risk. These proposals are important, because they will adapt our decades-old liquidity regime to the fund industry’s new and vastly altered landscape. The proposals we consider today are especially timely, for at least two reasons. First, a study published just last night suggests that U.S. bond funds need to sharpen their methodologies for analyzing the liquidity of their portfolios, because their current methods might be inadequate. And second, a resurgence of volatility in the bond markets in recent months has, in concert with shifting market dynamics, thrust liquidity concerns in that space to the forefront.

These proposals are intended to foster a rigorous and analytically sound approach to liquidity risk management, while also helping investors to better gauge the ability of funds to fulfill redemption obligations.


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