Tag: Supreme Court


Supreme Court: Fiduciaries Must Monitor Offered 401(k) Investment Alternatives

Boris Feldman is a member of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. This post is based on a WSGR alert.

On May 18, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Tibble v. Edison International that fiduciaries of 401(k) retirement plans have a continuing duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to monitor an investment alternative offered under a 401(k) plan after it is selected. In monitoring an investment alternative, the fiduciaries must engage in a prudent process. [1]

Although the principle described in Tibble was well understood by many 401(k) plan fiduciaries, the decision nonetheless serves as an important reminder that it is necessary for 401(k) plan fiduciaries to implement a due diligence process that will withstand scrutiny from the federal courts and the U.S. Department of Labor upon review.

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Implications of the Supreme Court Omnicare Decision

Boris Feldman is a member of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. This post is based on a WSGR alert authored by Mr. Feldman, Robert G. Day, Catherine Moreno, and Michael Nordtvedt.

On March 24, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Omnicare, Inc., et al. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund et al., addressing when an issuer may be held liable for material misstatements or omissions under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for statements of opinion in a registration statement.

Among other things, the Supreme Court held that an issuer may be held liable under Section 11 for a statement of opinion, even one that is sincerely held, if its registration statement omits facts about the issuer’s inquiry into, or knowledge concerning, a statement of opinion and if those facts conflict with what a reasonable investor, reading the statement fairly and in context, would take from the statement itself.

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Supreme Court’s Omnicare Decision Muddies Section 11 Opinion Liability Standards

The following post comes to us from Jon N. Eisenberg, partner in the Government Enforcement practice at K&L Gates LLP, and is based on a K&L Gates publication by Mr. Eisenberg. The complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

The Supreme Court has a long history of rejecting expansive interpretations of implied private rights of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Most notably, since 1975, it rejected the argument that mere holders, rather than only purchasers and sellers, may bring private damage actions under Section 10(b), rejected the argument that Section 10(b) liability may be imposed based on negligence rather than scienter, rejected the argument that Section 10(b) may be applied to “unfair” as opposed to fraudulent conduct, rejected the argument that purchase price inflation is enough to show damages under Section 10(b), rejected the argument that Section 10(b) reaches aiders and abettors rather than only primary violators, and rejected efforts to muddy the distinction between primary and secondary liability under Section 10(b).

The Court, however, has barely even mentioned Section 11 of the Securities Act in its opinions, much less interpreted it. Section 11, unlike Section 10(b), 1) provides an express private right of action, 2) is limited to misrepresentations and omissions in a registration statement, and 3) requires no proof of culpability although defendants other than an issuer have due diligence affirmative defenses. The Supreme Court’s March 24, 2015 decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, No. 13-435, is the Court’s first meaningful foray into Section 11. Unfortunately, the decision, which addresses opinion liability under Section 11, provides an amorphous standard that is likely to lead to unpredictable results. It should provide little comfort to plaintiffs or defendants and should make defendants more cautious about including unnecessary opinions in registration statements and, where appropriate, should lead them to carefully qualify opinions that they do include.

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Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association

The following post comes to us from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, and is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell publication by Brent J. McIntosh, Theodore O. Rogers, and Jeffrey B. Wall; the complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

The U.S. Supreme Court held on March 9, 2015 that agencies are not required to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures when amending or repealing their interpretations of existing regulations. The Court ruled that the D.C. Circuit’s longstanding Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which required agencies to follow notice-and-comment procedures when changing interpretive rules, was contrary to the text of the Administrative Procedure Act and exceeded the scope of judicial review authorized by Congress. The Court suggested, however, that changed interpretations should be subject to more searching review by courts, especially when regulated entities have extensively relied on the prior interpretation, and may face limitations in retroactive application. Three Justices wrote separately to question the fundamental appropriateness of judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations. Though the Court directed that an agency will need to provide a more substantial justification for its new interpretation if the new interpretation unsettles serious reliance interests or if it is based on factual findings contrary to prior findings, yesterday’s decision may make it easier for an agency to modify or even reverse its interpretation of existing regulations.

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Supreme Court Clarifies Liability for Opinions in Registration Statements

Robert Giuffra is a partner in Sullivan & Cromwell’s Litigation Group. The following post is based on a Sullivan & Cromwell publication by Mr. Giuffra, Brian T. Frawley, Brent J. McIntosh, and Jeffrey B. Wall; the complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

On March 24, 2015 in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, No. 13-435, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the requirement in Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 that a registration statement not “contain[] an untrue statement of a material fact” or “omit[] to state a material fact … necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” Specifically, the Court considered what plaintiffs need to plead under each of those phrases with respect to statements of opinion. The Court’s guidance is significant in light of the importance of pleading standards and motions to dismiss in securities litigation. The Court held, consistent with a majority of the federal courts of appeals, that a pure statement of opinion offered in a Section 11 filing is “an untrue statement of material fact” only if the plaintiff can plead (and ultimately prove) that the issuer did not actually hold the stated belief. At the same time, the Court held that the omission of certain material facts can render even a pure statement of opinion actionably misleading under Section 11. But the Court emphasized that pleading an omissions claim will be difficult because a plaintiff must identify specific, material facts whose omission makes the opinion statement misleading to a reasonable person reading the statement fairly and in context. The Supreme Court’s decision should curtail Section 11 litigation over honestly held opinions that turn out to be wrong, but it may cause the plaintiffs’ bar to bring claims that issuers have not accompanied their opinions with sufficient material facts underlying those opinions. To ward off the risk of such lawsuits, issuers should consider supplementing their disclosure documents with information about the bases of their opinions that could be material to a reasonable investor.

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A Job is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism

The following post discusses a recent working paper of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance, issued by Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, the Austin Wakeman Scott Lecturer on Law and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance. The paper, which is based on a Keynote speech to the 42nd Annual Securities Regulation Institute of Northwestern University School of Law, is available here.

Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, and the Austin Wakeman Scott Lecturer on Law and a Senior Fellow of the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance, delivered the Alan B. Levenson Keynote speech to the 42nd Annual Securities Regulation Institute of Northwestern University School of Law and an address to the American Constitution Society Student Chapter at Harvard Law School based on an article he recently posted to SSRN here.

This article connects the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby to the history of “corporate paternalism.” It details the history of employer efforts to restrict the freedom of employees, and legislative attempts to ensure worker freedom. It also highlights the role of employment in healthcare coverage, and situates the Affordable Care Act’s “minimum essential guarantees” in a historical and global context.

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Morrison at Four: A Survey of Its Impact on Securities Litigation

George Conway is partner in the Litigation Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. The following post is based on a recent essay by Mr. Conway, “Morrison at Four: A Survey of Its Impact on Securities Litigation.” Mr. Conway briefed and argued Morrison v. National Australia Bank in the Supreme Court.

My essay, Morrison at Four: A Survey of Its Impact on Securities Litigation, published by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform as part of a collection of essays on the shifting legal landscape governing federal claims involving foreign disputes, recounts the extraordinary impact of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), in the realm of securities litigation.

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Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment

John Coates is the John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard Law School.

This article, Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, provides a preliminary quantitative and qualitative appraisal of the Roberts Court’s securities law decisions. In the Roberts Court, decisions that “expand” or “restrict” the reach of securities law have occurred in roughly the same 50/50 proportion as in the Rehnquist Court after the departure of Justice Powell, and polarization (5-4 votes and dissents) has decreased. A simple political attitudinal model fails to account for these developments. The article proposes that Roberts Court’s securities law decisions are better understood in the context of Chief Roberts’ background as an appellate litigator and the Roberts Court’s broader “procedural revolution,” which has been more prominent in contract, commercial, and antitrust cases. This procedure-based analysis is then used to predict likely outcomes of securities law cases to be argued in the October 2014 term and to forecast the types of cases that are likely to gain the Court’s attention moving forward.

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2014 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update

The following post comes to us from Jonathan C. Dickey, partner and Co-Chair of the National Securities Litigation Practice Group at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, and is based on a Gibson Dunn publication.

It almost goes without saying that the first half of 2014 brought with it the most significant development in securities litigation in decades: the U.S. Supreme Court decided Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.—Halliburton II. In Halliburton II, the Court declined to revisit its earlier decision in Basic v. Levinson, Inc.; plaintiffs may therefore continue to avail themselves of the legal presumption of reliance, a presumption necessary for many class action plaintiffs to achieve class certification. But the Court also reiterated what it said 20 years ago in Basic: the presumption of reliance is rebuttable. And the Court clarified that defendants may now rebut the presumption at the class certification stage with evidence that the alleged misrepresentation did not affect the security’s price, making “price impact” evidence essential to class certification.

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Hedge Funds and Material Nonpublic Information

The following post comes to us from Jon N. Eisenberg, partner in the Government Enforcement practice at K&L Gates LLP, and is based on a K&L Gates publication by Mr. Eisenberg; the complete publication, including footnotes, is available here.

The last thing hedge funds need is another wake up call about the risks of liability for trading on the basis of material nonpublic information. But if they did, a July 17 article in the Wall Street Journal would provide it. According to the article, the SEC is investigating nearly four dozen hedge funds, asset managers and other firms to determine whether they traded on material nonpublic information concerning a change in Medicare reimbursement rates. If so, it appears that the material nonpublic information, if any, may have originated from a staffer on the House Ways and Means Committee, was then communicated to a law firm lobbyist, was further communicated by the lobbyist to a political intelligence firm, and finally, was communicated to clients who traded. According to an April 3, 2013 Wall Street Journal article, the political intelligence firm issued a flash report to clients on April 1, 2013 at 3:42 p.m.—18 minutes before the market closed and 35 minutes before the government announced that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services would increase reimbursements by 3.3%, rather than reduce them 2.3%, as initially proposed. Shares in several large insurance firms rose as much as 6% in the last 18 minutes of trading.

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