Tag: Systemic risk

The Volcker Rule as Structural Law

John C. Coates is the John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard Law School.

In response to the 2008 financial crisis the US Congress introduced the “Volker Rule”—a novel law generally barring banking organizations from proprietary trading and investing in hedge and private equity funds. Before implementing the Volcker Rule, US governmental agencies are required by administrative law to follow specified notice-and-comment procedures, and courts have a role in enforcing an obligation that agencies not be “arbitrary” in finalizing regulations. Many continue to advocate that the financial agencies also use quantified cost-benefit analysis in doing so. In principle, ad law requirements should help the public evaluate the impact of the Rule and hold agencies accountable in exercising their discretion and delegated authority in choosing among ways to implement a legislative requirement. However, in The Volcker Rule as Structural Law: Implications for Cost-Benefit Analysis and Administrative Law, a forthcoming article in a symposium issue of the Capital Markets Law Journal that focuses on the Volcker Rule, I build on prior work published in the Yale Law Journal and Law and Contemporary Problems to argue that the effects of a structural law such as the Volcker rule and its implementation by agencies cannot be reliably or precisely quantified, and courts err when they attempt to force agencies to do so under the guise of review for procedural regularity or substantive rationality.


Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty

Steven L. Schwarcz is the Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business at Duke University School of Law. This post is based on a draft article by Professor Schwarcz, available here.

Although corporate risk-taking is economically necessary and even desirable, it can also be harmful. There is widespread agreement that excessive corporate risk-taking was one of the primary causes of the systemic collapse that caused the 2008-09 financial crisis. To avoid another devastating collapse, most financial regulation since the crisis is directed at reducing excessive corporate risk-taking by systemically important firms. Often that regulation focuses on aligning managerial and investor interests, on the assumption that investors generally would oppose excessively risky business ventures.

My article, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, argues that assumption is flawed. What constitutes “excessive” risk-taking depends on the observer; risk-taking is excessive from a given observer’s standpoint if, on balance, it is expected to harm that observer. As a result, the law inadvertently allows systemically important firms to engage in risk-taking ventures that are expected to benefit the firm and its investors but, because much of the systemic harm from the firm’s failure would be externalized onto other market participants as well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse, harm the public.


Dodd-Frank Turns Five, What’s Next?

Daniel F.C. Crowley is a partner at K&L Gates LLP. This post is based on a K&L Gates publication by Mr. Crowley, Bruce J. HeimanSean P. Donovan-Smith, and Giovanni Campi.

The 2008 credit crisis was the beginning of an era of unprecedented government management of the capital markets. July 21, 2015 marked the fifth anniversary of the hallmark congressional response, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”). Dodd-Frank resulted in an extraordinary revamp of the regulatory regime that governs the U.S. financial system and, consequently, has significant implications for the U.S. economy and the international financial system.

Members of Congress recognized the fifth anniversary of Dodd-Frank in markedly different ways. House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) has held two of a series of three hearings to examine whether the United States is more prosperous, free, and stable five years after enactment of the law. In contrast, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)—one of the leading proponents of the law—and other members of Congress have criticized the slow pace of implementation by the regulatory agencies. Meanwhile, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Richard Shelby (R-AL) is advancing the “Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015,” which seeks to amend a number of provisions of Dodd-Frank.


Unfinished Reform in the Global Financial System

Lewis B. Kaden is John Harvey Gregory Lecturer on World Organizations, Harvard Law School, and Senior Fellow of the Mossavar-Rahmani Center on Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School of Government. This post is based on Mr. Kaden’s paper, which was adapted from remarks delivered at Cambridge University on February 27, 2015 and at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University on April 9, 2015. The full paper is available for download here.

This paper offers a perspective on the challenges that the global financial system will face in the course of the next decade. While there has been significant progress since the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the slow and uneven pressure of recovery and reform, a great deal of important work lies ahead. Part I briefly reviews, for the purpose of general background, the context and causes of the financial crisis. Part II identifies the key lessons to be learned from the crisis, and Part III outlines the major reforms adopted to date in the United States, Europe and the G-20. Finally, Part IV highlights what I regard as the principal ongoing issues affecting the financial system and suggests some approaches for dealing with them.


Fed/FDIC Comments on Wave 3 Resolution Plans

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer.

On July 28th, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board (together, “the regulators”) announced that they have provided private feedback on the resolution plans of 119 Wave 3 banking institutions [1] and the three systemically important non-bank financial institutions. [2] Unlike the regulators’ highly critical August 2014 public commentary on the 2013 resolution plans filed by Wave 1 banking institutions, [3] this week’s comments are largely silent on the regulators’ view of the plans’ adequacy:


A Reassessment of the Clearing Mandate

Ilya Beylin is a Postdoctoral Research Scholar at Columbia Law School and the Editor-at-Large of the CLS Blue Sky Blog. This post is based on an article authored by Mr. Beylin.

Following the financial crisis, the G-20 nations committed to a raft of reforms for swap markets. These reforms are intended to mitigate systemic risk, and with it, the damage that failing financial institutions inflict on the financial sector and the broader economy. A core component of the reforms is the introduction of the “clearing mandate” for standardized swaps.

Clearing refers to the interposition of a clearinghouse, or central counterparty, between the two parties to a financial transaction. When a swap is cleared, the initial swap is extinguished and two new swaps are created in its place. The first is an identical swap between the first counterparty and the clearinghouse, and the second is another identical swap between the clearinghouse and the second counterparty. In this manner, absent default, parties make payments as they would if they had transacted bilaterally and the clearinghouse simply passes the payments between counterparties. However, when one of the counterparties to a transaction defaults, the presence of the clearinghouse as an intermediate counterparty shields the non-defaulting party from losses; that is because although the defaulting party may not pay the clearinghouse, the clearinghouse is still liable for, and makes, the payment to the remaining counterparty.


A Framework for Understanding Financial Institutions

Robert Merton is Professor of Finance at the MIT Sloan School of Management. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Merton and Richard Thakor, also of the Finance Group at the MIT Sloan School of Management.

Many financial intermediaries provide “credit-sensitive” financial services—the effective delivery of these services depends on the credit-worthiness of the provider. This potential sensitivity of the perceived value of the intermediary’s services to the intermediary’s credit risk has important ramifications. In the paper, Customers and Investors: A Framework for Understanding Financial Institutions, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine how this affects the design of contracts between intermediaries and their customers, and how it illuminates ubiquitous features in a wide variety of contracts, institutions, and regulatory practices.


Fed’s Final G-SIB Surcharge Rule

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Roozbeh Alavi, Lance Auer, and Kevin Clarke.

On July 20th, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) finalized its capital surcharge rule for the eight US global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). [1] The rule (which was proposed last December), implements the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS) related standard in the US, but adds a second US-specific methodology that incorporates a charge against a G-SIB’s reliance on short-term wholesale funding (STWF). Under the final rule, a US G-SIB’s surcharge would be set as the higher number calculated under the BCBS methodology and under the US-specific methodology incorporating STWF. The surcharge will be phased in over three years (in 25% increments) beginning January 1, 2016. Along with the capital conservation buffer, the G-SIB surcharge sets a new risk-based capital bar for US G-SIBs. [2]


Fed’s Proposed Amendments to Capital Plan & Stress Test Rules

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer.

On July 17th, the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) issued a proposed rule that provides some relief from capital stress testing requirements. [1] Most notably, it eliminates advanced approaches risk-weighted assets and tier 1 common capital (“T1C”) calculations from stress testing, and provides a one year delay in the application of the supplementary leverage ratio (“SLR”) to stress testing. The proposal also does not incorporate the G-SIB surcharge into stress testing at this stage—see PwC’s First take: Key points from the Fed’s final G-SIB surcharge rule (July 22, 2015)—and makes clear that no additional changes will be applied to next year’s stress testing cycle.


Revisiting the Regulatory Framework of the US Treasury Market

Luis A. Aguilar is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Commissioner Aguilar’s recent public statement; the full text, including footnotes, is available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Aguilar and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Yesterday [July 13, 2015], staff members of the federal agencies that comprise the Interagency Working Group for Treasury Market Surveillance (“Working Group”) issued a joint report concerning the so-called “flash crash” that occurred in the U.S. Treasury market on October 15, 2014 (the “Report”). I commend the staff of all the agencies for their hard work in putting together the Report, which examined the events of that day and the broader forces that have changed the Treasury market in recent years. This was a difficult undertaking, but the report does an excellent job of discussing the known factors, while acknowledging that more work needs to be done.

The remarkable events of that day, which cannot yet be fully explained, have dispelled any lingering notion that the Treasury market is the staid marketplace it was once thought to be. The transformative changes that swept through the equities and options markets in the past decade have vastly reshaped the landscape of the Treasury market, as well. As a result, the structure, participants, and technological underpinnings of today’s Treasury market are far different than they were just a few years ago.


  • Subscribe

  • Cosponsored By:

  • Supported By:

  • Programs Faculty & Senior Fellows

    Lucian Bebchuk
    Alon Brav
    Robert Charles Clark
    John Coates
    Alma Cohen
    Stephen M. Davis
    Allen Ferrell
    Jesse Fried
    Oliver Hart
    Ben W. Heineman, Jr.
    Scott Hirst
    Howell Jackson
    Robert J. Jackson, Jr.
    Wei Jiang
    Reinier Kraakman
    Robert Pozen
    Mark Ramseyer
    Mark Roe
    Robert Sitkoff
    Holger Spamann
    Guhan Subramanian

  • Program on Corporate Governance Advisory Board

    William Ackman
    Peter Atkins
    Joseph Bachelder
    John Bader
    Allison Bennington
    Daniel Burch
    Richard Climan
    Jesse Cohn
    Isaac Corré
    Scott Davis
    John Finley
    David Fox
    Stephen Fraidin
    Byron Georgiou
    Larry Hamdan
    Carl Icahn
    Jack B. Jacobs
    Paula Loop
    David Millstone
    Theodore Mirvis
    James Morphy
    Toby Myerson
    Morton Pierce
    Barry Rosenstein
    Paul Rowe
    Rodman Ward