Tag: Systemic risk


Dodd-Frank Turns Five, What’s Next?

Daniel F.C. Crowley is a partner at K&L Gates LLP. This post is based on a K&L Gates publication by Mr. Crowley, Bruce J. HeimanSean P. Donovan-Smith, and Giovanni Campi.

The 2008 credit crisis was the beginning of an era of unprecedented government management of the capital markets. July 21, 2015 marked the fifth anniversary of the hallmark congressional response, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”). Dodd-Frank resulted in an extraordinary revamp of the regulatory regime that governs the U.S. financial system and, consequently, has significant implications for the U.S. economy and the international financial system.

Members of Congress recognized the fifth anniversary of Dodd-Frank in markedly different ways. House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) has held two of a series of three hearings to examine whether the United States is more prosperous, free, and stable five years after enactment of the law. In contrast, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)—one of the leading proponents of the law—and other members of Congress have criticized the slow pace of implementation by the regulatory agencies. Meanwhile, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Richard Shelby (R-AL) is advancing the “Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015,” which seeks to amend a number of provisions of Dodd-Frank.

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Unfinished Reform in the Global Financial System

Lewis B. Kaden is John Harvey Gregory Lecturer on World Organizations, Harvard Law School, and Senior Fellow of the Mossavar-Rahmani Center on Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School of Government. This post is based on Mr. Kaden’s paper, which was adapted from remarks delivered at Cambridge University on February 27, 2015 and at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University on April 9, 2015. The full paper is available for download here.

This paper offers a perspective on the challenges that the global financial system will face in the course of the next decade. While there has been significant progress since the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the slow and uneven pressure of recovery and reform, a great deal of important work lies ahead. Part I briefly reviews, for the purpose of general background, the context and causes of the financial crisis. Part II identifies the key lessons to be learned from the crisis, and Part III outlines the major reforms adopted to date in the United States, Europe and the G-20. Finally, Part IV highlights what I regard as the principal ongoing issues affecting the financial system and suggests some approaches for dealing with them.

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Fed/FDIC Comments on Wave 3 Resolution Plans

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer.

On July 28th, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board (together, “the regulators”) announced that they have provided private feedback on the resolution plans of 119 Wave 3 banking institutions [1] and the three systemically important non-bank financial institutions. [2] Unlike the regulators’ highly critical August 2014 public commentary on the 2013 resolution plans filed by Wave 1 banking institutions, [3] this week’s comments are largely silent on the regulators’ view of the plans’ adequacy:

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A Reassessment of the Clearing Mandate

Ilya Beylin is a Postdoctoral Research Scholar at Columbia Law School and the Editor-at-Large of the CLS Blue Sky Blog. This post is based on an article authored by Mr. Beylin.

Following the financial crisis, the G-20 nations committed to a raft of reforms for swap markets. These reforms are intended to mitigate systemic risk, and with it, the damage that failing financial institutions inflict on the financial sector and the broader economy. A core component of the reforms is the introduction of the “clearing mandate” for standardized swaps.

Clearing refers to the interposition of a clearinghouse, or central counterparty, between the two parties to a financial transaction. When a swap is cleared, the initial swap is extinguished and two new swaps are created in its place. The first is an identical swap between the first counterparty and the clearinghouse, and the second is another identical swap between the clearinghouse and the second counterparty. In this manner, absent default, parties make payments as they would if they had transacted bilaterally and the clearinghouse simply passes the payments between counterparties. However, when one of the counterparties to a transaction defaults, the presence of the clearinghouse as an intermediate counterparty shields the non-defaulting party from losses; that is because although the defaulting party may not pay the clearinghouse, the clearinghouse is still liable for, and makes, the payment to the remaining counterparty.

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A Framework for Understanding Financial Institutions

Robert Merton is Professor of Finance at the MIT Sloan School of Management. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Merton and Richard Thakor, also of the Finance Group at the MIT Sloan School of Management.

Many financial intermediaries provide “credit-sensitive” financial services—the effective delivery of these services depends on the credit-worthiness of the provider. This potential sensitivity of the perceived value of the intermediary’s services to the intermediary’s credit risk has important ramifications. In the paper, Customers and Investors: A Framework for Understanding Financial Institutions, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine how this affects the design of contracts between intermediaries and their customers, and how it illuminates ubiquitous features in a wide variety of contracts, institutions, and regulatory practices.

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Fed’s Final G-SIB Surcharge Rule

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Roozbeh Alavi, Lance Auer, and Kevin Clarke.

On July 20th, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) finalized its capital surcharge rule for the eight US global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). [1] The rule (which was proposed last December), implements the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS) related standard in the US, but adds a second US-specific methodology that incorporates a charge against a G-SIB’s reliance on short-term wholesale funding (STWF). Under the final rule, a US G-SIB’s surcharge would be set as the higher number calculated under the BCBS methodology and under the US-specific methodology incorporating STWF. The surcharge will be phased in over three years (in 25% increments) beginning January 1, 2016. Along with the capital conservation buffer, the G-SIB surcharge sets a new risk-based capital bar for US G-SIBs. [2]

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Fed’s Proposed Amendments to Capital Plan & Stress Test Rules

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer.

On July 17th, the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”) issued a proposed rule that provides some relief from capital stress testing requirements. [1] Most notably, it eliminates advanced approaches risk-weighted assets and tier 1 common capital (“T1C”) calculations from stress testing, and provides a one year delay in the application of the supplementary leverage ratio (“SLR”) to stress testing. The proposal also does not incorporate the G-SIB surcharge into stress testing at this stage—see PwC’s First take: Key points from the Fed’s final G-SIB surcharge rule (July 22, 2015)—and makes clear that no additional changes will be applied to next year’s stress testing cycle.

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Revisiting the Regulatory Framework of the US Treasury Market

Luis A. Aguilar is a Commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. This post is based on Commissioner Aguilar’s recent public statement; the full text, including footnotes, is available here. The views expressed in the post are those of Commissioner Aguilar and do not necessarily reflect those of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the other Commissioners, or the Staff.

Yesterday [July 13, 2015], staff members of the federal agencies that comprise the Interagency Working Group for Treasury Market Surveillance (“Working Group”) issued a joint report concerning the so-called “flash crash” that occurred in the U.S. Treasury market on October 15, 2014 (the “Report”). I commend the staff of all the agencies for their hard work in putting together the Report, which examined the events of that day and the broader forces that have changed the Treasury market in recent years. This was a difficult undertaking, but the report does an excellent job of discussing the known factors, while acknowledging that more work needs to be done.

The remarkable events of that day, which cannot yet be fully explained, have dispelled any lingering notion that the Treasury market is the staid marketplace it was once thought to be. The transformative changes that swept through the equities and options markets in the past decade have vastly reshaped the landscape of the Treasury market, as well. As a result, the structure, participants, and technological underpinnings of today’s Treasury market are far different than they were just a few years ago.

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Resolution: Deposit Insurance—Burden Shifts to Bank

Dan Ryan is Leader of the Financial Services Advisory Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. This post is based on a PwC publication by Mr. Ryan, Mike Alix, Adam Gilbert, and Armen Meyer.

On April 21st, the FDIC proposed new requirements for its largest supervised banks (37 institutions) to improve the record keeping of their deposit accounts. Issued via an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPR”), the proposal shifts the obligation of calculating FDIC deposit insurance payouts from the FDIC to the banks.

The agency has for some time been concerned about its ability to accurately calculate deposit insurance payouts during a short window following the failure of a large bank. These concerns are in part fueled by the current trend of deposit concentration at the largest banks, and the banks’ (and perhaps the FDIC’s) inadequate technological capability to timely process significant volumes of data.

We expect meeting these proposed requirements to be challenging for banks, especially with respect to obtaining necessary account information that is not currently collected. In addition, banks will need to significantly invest in their data systems to be able to maintain and process this (and other) information in a standardized format, and to calculate insurance payouts at the end of each business day.

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Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-To-Fail Finance

Mark Roe is the David Berg Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where he teaches bankruptcy and corporate law. Professor Roe received the European Corporate Governance Institute’s 2015 Allen & Overy Prize for best corporate governance paper. The article, Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-To-Fail Finance, appeared in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and was discussed on the Forum here as a working paper. In the following summary, Mr. Roe updates the earlier post.

In Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-to-Fail Finance, I examined how and why financial conglomerates that have grown too large to be efficient find themselves free from the standard and internal and external corporate structural pressures push to resize the firm. The too-big-to-fail funding boost—from lower financing costs because lenders know that the government is unlikely to let the biggest financial firms fail—shields the financial firm’s management from restructuring pressures. The boost’s shielding properties operate similar to “poison pills” for industrial firms, in shielding managers and boards from restructurings. But unlike the conventional pill, the impact of the too-big-to-fail funding boost reduces the incentives of insiders to restructure the firm, not just outsiders. These weakened restructuring incentives weaken both the largest financial firms and the financial system overall, making it more susceptible to crises. The article predicts that if and when too-big-to-fail subsidies diminish, the largest financial firms will face strong pressures to restructure.

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