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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Go-Shops With Matching Rights: Reimbursing Topping Bidders &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Go-Shops With Matching Rights: Reimbursing Topping Bidders</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/05/21/go-shops-with-matching-rights-and-reimbursing-topping-bidders/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=go-shops-with-matching-rights-and-reimbursing-topping-bidders</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/05/21/go-shops-with-matching-rights-and-reimbursing-topping-bidders/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 May 2007 03:55:35 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Mark Morton: In the typical M&#38;A deal, there&#8217;s generally a match right.  As a result, the target can&#8217;t actually terminate the merger agreement for the superior proposal until the first bidder decides whether or not to match.  If the first bidder matches, he wins (unless he&#8217;s topped again).  In that case, the target will not [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Mark A. Morton, Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP (Delaware), and Lawrence Hamermesh, Widener University School of Law, on Tuesday, May 22, 2007 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">We&#8217;re pleased to host the following dialogue between <a href="http://www.potteranderson.com/attorneys-39.html">Mark Morton</a> of <a href="http://www.potteranderson.com/">Potter Anderson and Corroon</a> and <a href="http://www.law.widener.edu/faculty/de/hamermesh/bio.shtml">Larry Hamermesh</a> of <a href="http://www.law.widener.edu/">Widener Law School</a>, precipitated by <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/05/11/go-shops-market-check-magic-or-mirage">Mark&#8217;s ruminations</a> about sellers&#8217; insistence that a <a href="http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2006/03/27/go-shop-provisions-in-acquisitions-agreements/">go-shop provision</a> with a matching right in a merger agreement be <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2007/05/20070509%20Go%20Shops--Market%20Check%20Magic%20or%20Mirage.pdf">accompanied by a right to reimburse the expenses of a topping bidder who is subsequently matched</a>.  As always, we welcome reader comments on the discussion below.</p>
</div></hgroup><p><strong>Mark Morton:</strong> In the typical M&amp;A deal, there&#8217;s generally a match right.  As a result, the target can&#8217;t actually terminate the merger agreement for the superior proposal until the first bidder decides whether or not to match.  If the first bidder matches, he wins (unless he&#8217;s topped again).  In that case, the target will not have signed a merger agreement with the interloper, so the interloper doesn&#8217;t get a termination fee.  As a result, the interloper gets nothing for his superior bid&#8211;other than a large chunk of unreimbursed expenses.  I would argue, therefore, that the presence of a match right creates a significant disincentive to topping bids.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/05/21/go-shops-with-matching-rights-and-reimbursing-topping-bidders/#more-135" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Go-Shops With Matching Rights: Reimbursing Topping Bidders">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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