<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/11/23/study-of-majority-voting-in-director-elections/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 11:32:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.8</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/11/23/study-of-majority-voting-in-director-elections/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=study-of-majority-voting-in-director-elections</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/11/23/study-of-majority-voting-in-director-elections/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Nov 2007 22:24:26 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Majority voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder elections]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/11/23/study-of-majority-voting-in-director-?d=20150122114223EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[We have recently released the November 2007 edition of the Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections, which demonstrates that majority voting for the election of directors, which has been characterized by its advocates as a tool for increasing director accountability, has become the prevailing election standard among large, public companies. As issuers prepare for [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Robert Jackson, Managing Editor, Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog, on Friday, November 23, 2007 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">This post comes to us from <a href="http://www.ngelaw.com/attorney/bio.aspx?ID=723">Claudia H. Allen</a> of <a href="http://www.ngelaw.com/home.aspx" target="_blank">Neal, Gerber &amp; Eisenberg LLP</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>We have recently released the November 2007 edition of the <em><a href="http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/majoritystudy111207.pdf" target="_blank">Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections</a></em>, which demonstrates that majority voting for the election of directors, which has been characterized by its advocates as a tool for increasing director accountability, has become the prevailing election standard among large, public companies. As issuers prepare for the 2008 proxy season, a few statistics and examples drawn from the <em>Study</em> underscore that majority voting has become a relatively mature, as well as widespread, movement.</p>
<p><strong>Majority Voting in the S&amp;P 500 and Fortune 500.</strong> 66% of the companies in the S&amp;P 500 and over 57% of the companies in the Fortune 500 have adopted a form of majority voting, notwithstanding robust levels of merger and acquisition activity early in 2007 that resulted in several firms with majority voting going private. By way of contrast, when the <em>Study </em>was initially published in 2006, only 16% of the companies in the S&amp;P 500 had adopted a form of majority voting.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/11/23/study-of-majority-voting-in-director-elections/#more-312" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/11/23/study-of-majority-voting-in-director-elections/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
