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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Value of Control in Emerging Markets &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Value of Control in Emerging Markets</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/12/02/the-value-of-control-in-emerging-markets/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-value-of-control-in-emerging-markets</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/12/02/the-value-of-control-in-emerging-markets/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Dec 2009 16:57:23 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cross-border transactions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging markets]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Foreign acquisitions extend the boundaries of the firm across national borders. In the context of emerging markets, these boundaries are extended across countries with vast asymmetries in institutions and property rights protection. If developed-market firms can extend the benefits associated with superior institutions to their operations in emerging markets by acquiring control, the stock price [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jim Naughton, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday, December 2, 2009 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">This post comes to us from <a href="http://www.unc.edu/~achari/" target="_blank">Anusha Chari</a> and <a href="http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/Faculty/search/detail.cfm?person_id=948" target="_blank">Paige Ouimet</a>, Assistant Professors of Finance at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and <a href="http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ltesar/" target="_blank">Linda Tesar</a>, Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Foreign acquisitions extend the boundaries of the firm across national borders. In the context of emerging markets, these boundaries are extended across countries with vast asymmetries in institutions and property rights protection. If developed-market firms can extend the benefits associated with superior institutions to their operations in emerging markets by acquiring control, the stock price of the acquiring firms should reflect these value gains. In our forthcoming Review of Financial Studies paper, The Value of Control in Emerging Markets, we examine the returns to shareholders of developed-market firms that undertook acquisitions in emerging markets.</p>
<p>We find that when developed-market acquirers gain control of emerging-market targets, they experience positive and significant abnormal returns of 1.16%, on average, over a three-day event window. In the context of the well-documented underperformance of acquiring firms in U.S. mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;A) transactions, this return is somewhat anomalous. It is also fairly substantial when viewed in relation to the size of acquiring firms in these transactions. The acquirer stock price reaction suggests a median (mean) dollar value gain of $4.07 ($30.15) million for the acquirer. In comparison, the median (mean) transaction value in an emerging-market acquisition where control is acquired is $42.41 ($308.57) million. In contrast, acquisitions of minority stakes do not deliver significant acquirer returns.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/12/02/the-value-of-control-in-emerging-markets/#more-5705" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Value of Control in Emerging Markets">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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