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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Ten Thoughts for Ordering Governance Relationships in 2010 &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Ten Thoughts for Ordering Governance Relationships in 2010</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/01/11/ten-thoughts-for-ordering-governance-relationships-in-2010/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=ten-thoughts-for-ordering-governance-relationships-in-2010</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Jan 2010 13:21:25 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy access]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy season]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Say on pay]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[As the 2010 proxy season nears, we encourage both boards and shareholders to rethink the contours of their relationship. We expect institutional shareholders to have greater influence in director elections this year given the increasing prevalence of majority voting requirements and, for the first time, the absence of discretionary voting by brokers of uninstructed shares. [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Holly Gregory, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, on Monday, January 11, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.weil.com/hollygregory/" target="_blank">Holly Gregory</a> is a Corporate Partner specializing in corporate governance at Weil, Gotshal &amp; Manges LLP. This post is based on a Weil Gotshal client memorandum by Ms. Gregory, <a href="http://www.weil.com/iramillstein/" target="_blank">Ira M. Millstein</a> and <a href="http://www.weil.com/rebeccagrapsas/" target="_blank">Rebecca C. Grapsas</a>. The complete memorandum is available <a href="http://www.weil.com/files/upload/Alert_Ordering_Governance_Relationships_in_2010.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>As the 2010 proxy season nears, we encourage both boards and shareholders to rethink the contours of their relationship. We expect institutional shareholders to have greater influence in director elections this year given the increasing prevalence of majority voting requirements and, for the first time, the absence of discretionary voting by brokers of uninstructed shares. Institutional shareholder power will expand further in 2011 if the SEC moves forward with proxy access rules and Congress enacts legislation mandating majority voting and “say on pay.” In this environment, boards and shareholders will be well served by considering in an open way how this shift in influence should be reflected in changes in behavior.</p>
<p><strong><em>For boards</em></strong>, the challenge will be to understand the key concerns of the company’s shareholder base and get out ahead on these issues. Boards should also consider whether company disclosures and communications can be improved to better inform shareholders and encourage them to make company-specific decisions through a long-term lens. This will require devoting more attention, resources and creativity to communications and relations with shareholders. Boards that are insensitive to shareholder concerns risk bruising election battles, while providing further inducement for the homogenized governance mandates currently percolating in Washington.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/01/11/ten-thoughts-for-ordering-governance-relationships-in-2010/#more-6469" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Ten Thoughts for Ordering Governance Relationships in 2010">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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