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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Principles for Tying Equity Compensation to Long-Term Performance &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Principles for Tying Equity Compensation to Long-Term Performance</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/05/04/principles-for-tying-equity-compensation-to-long-term-performance/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=principles-for-tying-equity-compensation-to-long-term-performance</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 04 May 2010 13:29:43 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HLS Research]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In our recent study, Paying for Long-Term Performance, we provide a detailed blueprint for how equity-based compensation should be designed to tie executive payoffs to long-term results and to avoid excessive risk-taking incentives. Our conclusions can be distilled into the following eight “principles:” 1. Executives should not be free to unload restricted stock and options [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Harvard Law School, on Tuesday, May 4, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/" target="_blank">Lucian Bebchuk</a> is the William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. <a href="http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=722" target="_blank">Jesse Fried</a> is a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. This post builds on their discussion paper <strong>Paying for Long-Term Performance</strong>, issued by the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance, which is available <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1535355" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In our recent study, <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1535355" target="_blank">Paying for Long-Term Performance</a>, we provide a detailed blueprint for how equity-based compensation should be designed to tie executive payoffs to long-term results and to avoid excessive risk-taking incentives. Our conclusions can be distilled into the following eight “principles:”</p>
<ul>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>1. Executives should not be free to unload restricted stock and options as soon as they vest except to the extent necessary to cover any taxes arising from vesting.</li>
<li>2. Executives’ ability to unwind their equity incentives should not be tied to retirement.</li>
</ul>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/05/04/principles-for-tying-equity-compensation-to-long-term-performance/#more-8957" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Principles for Tying Equity Compensation to Long-Term Performance">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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