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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Designating Delaware as the Exclusive Jurisdiction for Intra-Corporate Disputes &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Designating Delaware as the Exclusive Jurisdiction for Intra-Corporate Disputes</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/05/11/designating-delaware-as-the-exclusive-jurisdiction-for-intra-corporate-disputes/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=designating-delaware-as-the-exclusive-jurisdiction-for-intra-corporate-disputes</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 11 May 2010 13:08:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[As with real estate acquisitions, where intra-corporate disputes are concerned, the key to optimal results is “location, location and location.” [1] The Delaware Chancery Court is widely regarded as the country’s preeminent business court, with experienced jurists who have deep understanding of Delaware corporate law and long standing precedent regarding corporations’ governance. Indeed, the enabling, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Charles M. Nathan, Latham & Watkins LLP, on Tuesday, May 11, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.lw.com/attorneys.aspx?page=attorneybio&amp;attno=00150" target="_blank">Charles Nathan</a> is Of Counsel at Latham &amp; Watkins LLP and is co-chair of the firm&#8217;s Corporate Governance Task Force. This post is based on a Latham &amp; Watkins Corporate Governance Commentary by Mr. Nathan, <a href="http://www.lw.com/attorneys.aspx?page=attorneybio&amp;attno=01264" target="_blank">Laurie Smilan</a>, <a href="http://www.lw.com/Attorneys.aspx?page=AttorneyBio&amp;attno=05844" target="_blank">Michele Kyrouz</a>, <a href="http://www.lw.com/Attorneys.aspx?page=AttorneyBio&amp;attno=07390" target="_blank">Timothy FitzSimons </a>and <a href="http://www.lw.com/Attorneys.aspx?page=AttorneyBio&amp;attno=04363" target="_blank">Derrick Farrell</a>, and relates in part to the recent decision in <em>In re Revlon, Inc. Shareholders Litig.</em>, which is available <a href="http://www.rlf.com/portalresource/lookup/poid/Z1tOl9NPluKPtDNIqLMRVPMQiLsSw8JCn43!/document.name=/In%20re%20Revlon%20Inc%20Shareholders%20Litigation.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. This post is part of the <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>, which is cosponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p><a name="1b"></a>As with real estate acquisitions, where intra-corporate disputes are concerned, the key to optimal results is “location, location and location.” <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/05/11/designating-delaware-as-the-exclusive-jurisdiction-for-intra-corporate-disputes#1">[1]</a> The Delaware Chancery Court is widely regarded as the country’s preeminent business court, with experienced jurists who have deep understanding of Delaware corporate law and long standing precedent regarding corporations’ governance. Indeed, the enabling, practical approach of Delaware law, the extensive body of judicial precedent and the expertise and business savvy of the Delaware Court of Chancery are the reasons that most companies choose to incorporate in Delaware in the first place.</p>
<p><a name="2b"></a>Unfortunately, plaintiffs’ lawyers often file cases against Delaware companies under Delaware law in jurisdictions other than Delaware. Often, this is because plaintiffs’ <a name="3b"></a>lawyers, particularly those with weak cases, hope that other, less experienced judges will misapply Delaware law, that the greater uncertainty of the outcome will increase the settlement value of the litigation <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/05/11/designating-delaware-as-the-exclusive-jurisdiction-for-intra-corporate-disputes#2">[2]</a> or that courts outside of Delaware are less likely to limit or reduce plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee awards. <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/05/11/designating-delaware-as-the-exclusive-jurisdiction-for-intra-corporate-disputes#3">[3]</a></p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/05/11/designating-delaware-as-the-exclusive-jurisdiction-for-intra-corporate-disputes/#more-9275" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Designating Delaware as the Exclusive Jurisdiction for Intra-Corporate Disputes">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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