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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/05/14/the-consequences-of-entrepreneurial-finance/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-consequences-of-entrepreneurial-finance</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 14 May 2010 14:42:07 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Private Equity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Angel groups]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Entrepreneurs]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In the paper, The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, my co-authors (William Kerr and Antoinette Schoar) and I document the role of angel funding for the growth, survival, and access to follow-on funding of high-growth start-up firms. We use a regression discontinuity approach to [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday, May 14, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/" target="_blank">Josh Lerner</a> is a Professor of Entrepreneurial Management and Finance at Harvard Business School.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In the paper, <strong><em>The Consequences of Entrepreneurial Finance: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis</em></strong>, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, my co-authors (William Kerr and Antoinette Schoar) and I document the role of angel funding for the growth, survival, and access to follow-on funding of high-growth start-up firms. We use a regression discontinuity approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity between firms that obtain funding and those that do not. This technique exploits that a small change in the collective interest levels of the angels can lead to a discrete change in the probability of funding for otherwise comparable ventures.</p>
<p>The results of this study and our border analysis in particular, suggest that angel investments improve entrepreneurial success. By looking above and below the discontinuity in a restricted sample, we remove the most worrisome endogeneity problems and the sorting between ventures and investors. We find that the localized increases in interest by angels at break points, which are clearly linked to obtaining critical mass for funding, are associated with discrete jumps in future outcomes like survival and stronger web traffic performance.</p>
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