The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation. Fri, 11 Sep 2026 11:32:14 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.10 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/cropped-photography-4-e1706898544564-1-32x32.png Proxy Access Is In – The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 32 32 Proxy Access Is In https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/08/25/proxy-access-is-in/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=proxy-access-is-in https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/08/25/proxy-access-is-in/#comments Wed, 25 Aug 2010 15:20:37 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=12455?d=20150106102815EST Posted by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst, Harvard Law School, on Wednesday, August 25, 2010
Editor's Note:

Lucian Bebchuk is Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School and author of The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot and The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise. Scott Hirst is Executive Director of the Corporate Governance Program and co-author with Professor Bebchuk of Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate.  Comments in support of the SEC’s proxy access rule submitted by one or both of them are available here, here and here.

The Securities and Exchange Commission today voted to approve a rule that provides shareholder with the right to place director candidates on the corporate ballot in certain circumstances.

The adoption of proxy access is a welcome and long overdue development. In our view, the case for providing shareholders with access to the corporate ballot is compelling. Last fall, one of us submitted on behalf of a bi-partisan group of eighty professors of law, business, economics, or finance a comment letter in support of adopting a proxy access proposal. The breadth of this group reflected the widespread support among academics for removing impediments to shareholders’ ability to nominate and elect directors. The case for the proposed rule is supported by the significant body of empirical work (described in another comment letter submitted by one of us) indicating that reducing incumbent directors’ insulation from removal is associated with improved value for shareholders.

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