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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Finally, Governance Becomes Possible &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Finally, Governance Becomes Possible</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/08/30/finally-governance-becomes-possible/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=finally-governance-becomes-possible</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Aug 2010 16:33:27 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Regulation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Dodd-Frank Act]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder nominations]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Thirty years late, the new Dodd-Frank Act hands shareholders power to influence the composition of boards and shape CEO pay. But will these institutional investors, on whom Americans depend for their financial security, use their authority responsibly? Will corporate boards welcome and accept good faith dialogue with their shareholders? Will both sides forego short term [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Ira Millstein, Well Gotshal & Manges LLP, and Stephen Davis, Yale School of Management, on Monday, August 30, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.weil.com/iramillstein/" target="_blank">Ira Millstein</a> is a partner at Well Gotshal &amp; Manges LLP and Senior Associate Dean for Corporate Governance of the Yale School of Management. <a href="http://mba.yale.edu/faculty/profiles/davis.shtml" target="_blank">Stephen Davis</a> is executive director of Yale&#8217;s Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Thirty years late, the new Dodd-Frank Act hands shareholders power to influence the composition of boards and shape CEO pay. But will these institutional investors, on whom Americans depend for their financial security, use their authority responsibly? Will corporate boards welcome and accept good faith dialogue with their shareholders? Will both sides forego short term financial engineering and align for the long term performance the country badly needs?</p>
<p>For decades, investors, anxious about a company gone awry, have had little choice but to complain from the sidelines, petitioning finger-wagging resolutions directors could easily ignore. Shareholders tried that to no avail at AIG before its epic collapse. Defenses fortified under-performing boards from pressure they should have faced to better control risks and tie CEO pay to measurable actual performance over time. But resolutions and defenses did not stop short-term funds that piled disabling debt on companies. Aggressive investors could cherry-pick firms for proxy fights or use stock techniques to harass. Long term institutional investors were shackled; the short term prevailed. One result: Too many boards tolerated management excesses and failures that ushered in the financial crisis.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/08/30/finally-governance-becomes-possible/#more-12609" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Finally, Governance Becomes Possible">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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