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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Access to the Mutual Fund Proxy &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Access to the Mutual Fund Proxy</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/09/22/access-to-the-mutual-fund-proxy/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=access-to-the-mutual-fund-proxy</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/09/22/access-to-the-mutual-fund-proxy/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Sep 2010 13:10:41 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legislative & Regulatory Developments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jones v. Harris]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy access]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rule 14a-11]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rule 14a-8]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[One topic missing from the early analysis of the SEC’s proxy access rulemaking [1] has been mutual funds as issuers. Though, a few experts have recognized the importance of mutual funds as shareholders. For example, Ira Millstein and Stephen Davis welcomed proxy access and noted that it “places a colossal bet that shareholders will patrol [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Scott Hirst, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday, September 22, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">This post comes to us from <a href="http://www.isenberg.umass.edu/management/Faculty/Profiles/Jennifer_Taub/" target="_blank">Jennifer Taub</a>, a Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Business Law Program at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.</p>
</div></hgroup><p><a name="1b"></a>One topic missing from the early analysis of the SEC’s proxy access rulemaking <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/09/22/access-to-the-mutual-fund-proxy#1">[1]</a> has been mutual funds as <em>issuers</em>. Though, a few experts have recognized the importance of mutual funds as <em>shareholders</em>. For example, Ira Millstein and Stephen Davis welcomed proxy access and noted that <a name="2b"></a>it “places a colossal bet that shareholders will patrol the market. Up to now many, including major mutual funds, have simply voted shares on autopilot.” <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/09/22/access-to-the-mutual-fund-proxy#2">[2]</a></p>
<p><a name="3b"></a>Indeed, given that they hold 24% of US corporate equity, <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/09/22/access-to-the-mutual-fund-proxy#3">[3]</a> the sway of mutual funds as shareholders is significant. This voting power might be tapped to reach the threshold to nominate corporate directors. And, this voting power will be used to support or block shareholder director nominees and shareholder proposals related to director nominations and elections. Notwithstanding this capacity, activists should not <a name="4b"></a>expect much from the largest mainstream fund families who historically favor management when casting proxy votes on shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals. <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/09/22/access-to-the-mutual-fund-proxy#4">[4]</a></p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/09/22/access-to-the-mutual-fund-proxy/#more-12746" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Access to the Mutual Fund Proxy">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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