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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>What Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth? &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>What Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth?</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/09/30/what-effect-will-citizens-united-have-on-shareholder-wealth/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=what-effect-will-citizens-united-have-on-shareholder-wealth</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Sep 2010 13:11:36 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Court Cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HLS Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Citizens United v. FEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political spending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder value]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Supreme Court]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In Citizens United, the Supreme Court relaxed the ability of corporations to spend money on elections, rejecting a shareholder-protection rationale for restrictions on spending. The decision was a &#8216;shock&#8217; to corporate governance of the majority of the largest US companies ­ overturning long-standing understandings about how shareholder money could be used by corporate managers in [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by John Coates, Harvard Law School, on Thursday, September 30, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=11" target="_blank" rel="noopener">John Coates</a> is the John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard Law School. This post relates to Professor Coates’ working paper, <em>Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth?</em>, which is available <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680861" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In <em>Citizens United</em>, the Supreme Court relaxed the ability of corporations to spend money on elections, rejecting a shareholder-protection rationale for restrictions on spending.</p>
<p>The decision was a &#8216;shock&#8217; to corporate governance of the majority of the largest US companies ­ overturning long-standing understandings about how shareholder money could be used by corporate managers in the political arena. The result is effectively to force future campaign finance regulation to invade and become intertwined with the domain of corporate governance regulation ­ with potential for politicizing that domain in a way that even the Enron crisis and the recent financial meltdown have not achieved.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/09/30/what-effect-will-citizens-united-have-on-shareholder-wealth/#more-13131" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading What Effect Will Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth?">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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