<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/24/incentives-financial-policy-and-downside-risk/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 11:30:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.10</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>The (Agency) Problem of Risk Incentives within Financial Institutions</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/24/incentives-financial-policy-and-downside-risk/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=incentives-financial-policy-and-downside-risk</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/24/incentives-financial-policy-and-downside-risk/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Nov 2010 14:05:47 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legislative & Regulatory Developments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Equity-based compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Incentives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Managerial wealth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=13970?d=20150106101749EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In the paper, Downside Risk and Agency Problems in the U.S. Financial Sector: Examining the Effect of Risk Incentives from 2007 to 2010, I consider risk incentives within financial institutions in the presence of two types of potential agency problems: the standard manager-shareholder agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and society. First, I [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday, November 24, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://people.stern.nyu.edu/svanbekk/" target="_blank">Sjoerd van Bekkum</a> of the Finance Department at New York University and the Erasmus School of Economics at Erasmus University.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In the paper, <strong><em>Downside Risk and Agency Problems in the U.S. Financial Sector: Examining the Effect of Risk Incentives from 2007 to 2010</em></strong>, I consider risk incentives within financial institutions in the presence of two types of potential agency problems: the standard manager-shareholder agency problem and the risk-shifting problem between shareholders and society. First, I evaluate the effect of risk incentives on shareholder returns during the financial crisis. Next, I examine the relation between risk incentives and three downside risk statistics. Value-at-risk resembles a financial institution&#8217;s tolerance to losses, expected shortfall resembles losses when the firm does poorly, and marginal expected shortfall resembles an institution&#8217;s exposure to loss spillovers from its peers.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/24/incentives-financial-policy-and-downside-risk/#more-13970" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The (Agency) Problem of Risk Incentives within Financial Institutions">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/24/incentives-financial-policy-and-downside-risk/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
