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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/26/ownership-structure-and-the-cost-of-corporate-borrowing/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=ownership-structure-and-the-cost-of-corporate-borrowing</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Nov 2010 13:08:23 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banking & Financial Institutions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Corporate Governance & Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bank loans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Control rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate debt]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In the paper, Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we study the financial consequences of the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights in a large sample of companies across 22 East Asian and Western European countries during the period from 1996 to 2008. Specifically, we [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday, November 26, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.cb.cityu.edu.hk/Portfolio/Staff.cfm?EID=chenlin" target="_blank">Chen Lin</a>, Professor of Finance at the Chinese University of Hong Kong; <a href="http://www.ln.edu.hk/econ/staff/yuema/Homepage/content.htm" target="_blank">Yue Ma</a>, Professor of Economics at Lingnan University, Hong Kong; <a href="http://foster.washington.edu/faculty/faculty_detail.asp?ID=66" target="_blank">Paul Malatesta</a>, Professor of Finance at the University of Washington; and <a href="http://www.people.hbs.edu/yxuan/" target="_blank">Yuhai Xuan</a>, Assistant Professor of Business Administration at the Finance Unit of Harvard Business School.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In the paper, <strong><em>Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing</em></strong>, forthcoming in the <em>Journal of Financial Economics</em>, we study the financial consequences of the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights in a large sample of companies across 22 East Asian and Western European countries during the period from 1996 to 2008. Specifically, we analyze the effects of control rights-cash-flow rights divergence on firms’ cost of borrowing and provide new insights into the link between the separation of ownership and control and corporate value.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/26/ownership-structure-and-the-cost-of-corporate-borrowing/#more-14041" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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