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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Synthetic Ownership Arrangements for Ambush Equity Accumulation &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Synthetic Ownership Arrangements for Ambush Equity Accumulation</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/27/synthetic-ownership-arrangements-for-ambush-equity-accumulation/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=synthetic-ownership-arrangements-for-ambush-equity-accumulation</link>
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		<pubDate>Sat, 27 Nov 2010 15:21:35 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[We have recently witnessed equity accumulations on both sides of the Atlantic that were first announced long after they began and long after the acquiring parties had effectively passed applicable disclosure thresholds.  Here in the U.S., Pershing Square and Vornado earlier this month announced a combined stake of almost 27% in J.C. Penney.  And last [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Adam O. Emmerich, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, on Saturday, November 27, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/Page.cfm/Thread/Attorneys/SubThread/Search/Name/Emmerich,%20Adam%20O." target="_blank">Adam Emmerich</a> is a partner in the corporate department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz focusing primarily on mergers and acquisitions and securities law matters. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Emmerich and <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/Page.cfm/Thread/Attorneys/SubThread/Search/Name/Savitt,%20William" target="_blank">William Savitt</a>. A portion of their memo was quoted in a recent <em>DealBook </em>column from the <em>New York Times</em>, available <a href="http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/sorkin-big-investors-appear-out-of-thin-air/" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>We have recently witnessed equity accumulations on both sides of the Atlantic that were first announced long after they began and long after the acquiring parties had effectively passed applicable disclosure thresholds.  Here in the U.S., Pershing Square and Vornado earlier this month announced a combined stake of almost 27% in J.C. Penney.  And last weekend French luxury-goods conglomerate LVMH announced that it had amassed a previously undisclosed stake in excess of 14% in Hermès, including through transactions extending over a period of years.  Although the details of both accumulation programs are as yet not fully known, they appear to have been conducted on the assumption that the U.S. and French regulatory regimes requiring prompt and current disclosure of share accumulations can be evaded through derivatives and other synthetic and structured ownership arrangements, even when they involve ownership of actual shares by counterparties, up until the point when such trades are settled by taking options on or physical delivery of the underlying shares.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/11/27/synthetic-ownership-arrangements-for-ambush-equity-accumulation/#more-13815" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Synthetic Ownership Arrangements for Ambush Equity Accumulation">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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