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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Corporate Law and Political Spending &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Corporate Law and Political Spending</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/12/01/corporate-law-and-political-spending/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=corporate-law-and-political-spending</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 2010 13:21:13 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Last week we presented our article, Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, at the Harvard Law Review’s annual Supreme Court Forum. The article is featured in the Review’s Supreme Court issue. The final version of the paper includes a substantial addition from prior versions: A section assembling empirical evidence on the potential financial significance of political [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Lucian Bebchuk, Harvard Law School, and Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Columbia Law School, on Wednesday, December 1, 2010 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/" target="_blank">Lucian Bebchuk</a> is a Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance at Harvard Law School. <a href="http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Robert_Jackson" target="_blank">Robert J. Jackson, Jr.</a> is an Associate Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. This post is based on their paper &#8220;Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?&#8221; available <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670085" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Last week we presented our article, <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670085" target="_blank">Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?</a>, at the <em>Harvard Law Review</em>’s annual Supreme Court Forum. The article is featured in the <em>Review</em>’s Supreme Court issue.</p>
<p>The final version of the paper includes a substantial addition from prior versions: A section assembling empirical evidence on the potential financial significance of political speech. The evidence shows that there is a basis for believing that public corporations may expend material amounts of corporate resources on political speech—and that, using the expanded freedom provided under recent Supreme Court decisions, may well spend even more in the future.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/12/01/corporate-law-and-political-spending/#more-14189" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Corporate Law and Political Spending">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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