The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation. Sun, 19 Jul 2026 11:30:24 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.8 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/cropped-photography-4-e1706898544564-1-32x32.png The Costs of Intense Board Monitoring – The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 32 32 The Costs of Intense Board Monitoring https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/12/06/the-costs-of-intense-board-monitoring/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-costs-of-intense-board-monitoring https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/12/06/the-costs-of-intense-board-monitoring/#comments Mon, 06 Dec 2010 14:25:15 +0000 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=14263?d=20150106101802EST Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday, December 6, 2010
Editor's Note:

The following post comes to us from Olubunmi Faleye of the Finance Department at Northeastern University, Rani Hoitash of the Department of Accountancy at Bentley University, and Udi Hoitash of the Accounting Department at Northeastern University.

In our paper The Costs of Intense Board Monitoring, forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics, we study the effects of the intensity of board monitoring on directors’ effectiveness in performing their monitoring and advising duties. Our objectives are three-fold. First, we examine whether the quality of board monitoring is enhanced when the board is more focused on monitoring. Second, we examine whether intense monitoring is associated with weaker advising. Third, we examine how this potential tradeoff between the quality of board monitoring and advising affects overall firm value, emphasizing the role of the firm’s advising requirements in the process. We define a monitoring intensive board as one on which a majority of independent directors concurrently serve on two or more of the monitoring committees (i.e. audit, compensation, and nominating).

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