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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value?</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/01/10/does-shareholder-proxy-access-improve-firm-value/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=does-shareholder-proxy-access-improve-firm-value</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Jan 2011 14:39:44 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[HLS Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legislative & Regulatory Developments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Business Roundtable v. SEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy access]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rule 14a-11]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stock returns]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In our paper, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we use a natural experiment to assess the shareholder wealth implications of shareholder proxy access. We study stock returns on October 4, 2010, when the SEC unexpectedly delayed proxy access for [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday, January 10, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&amp;facId=318530" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bo Becker</a> of the Finance Unit at Harvard Business School; <a href="http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&amp;facId=190513" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Daniel Bergstresser</a> of the Finance Unit at Harvard Business School; and <a href="http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=445" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Guhan Subramanian</a>, Professor of Law and Business at Harvard Law School and Professor of Business Law at Harvard Business School.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In our paper, <strong><em>Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge</em></strong>, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we use a natural experiment to assess the shareholder wealth implications of shareholder proxy access. We study stock returns on October 4, 2010, when the SEC unexpectedly delayed proxy access for U.S. public companies. The October 4 announcement makes a particularly useful event for empirical work because it was both material and unexpected. We identify firms most likely to be affected by proxy access as those with significant ownership by institutions with a history of attempts to change corporate policy (“activist institutions”).</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/01/10/does-shareholder-proxy-access-improve-firm-value/#more-14791" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value?">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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