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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Credit Quality as a Bonus Underpin &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Credit Quality as a Bonus Underpin</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/02/14/credit-quality-as-a-bonus-underpin/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=credit-quality-as-a-bonus-underpin</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Feb 2011 14:43:32 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Banking & Financial Institutions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bankruptcy & Financial Distress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banker bonuses]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Banks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Credit supply]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Financial crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moral hazard]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, bank remuneration remains a critically sensitive issue – for shareholders, creditors, regulators, governments and the general public. This is particularly the case for those systemically important financial institutions that received government bailouts. While many of these institutions are beginning to recover, the negative effects of increased debt [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Scott Hirst, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday, February 14, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">This post comes to us from <a href="http://www.fandc.com/new/Institutional/default.aspx?id=82501" target="_blank">George Dallas</a>, Director of Corporate Governance at F&amp;C Management Ltd., and is based on a concept paper prepared by F&amp;C Management.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, bank remuneration remains a critically sensitive issue – for shareholders, creditors, regulators, governments and the general public. This is particularly the case for those systemically important financial institutions that received government bailouts. While many of these institutions are beginning to recover, the negative effects of increased debt taken on at the public sector level to protect the financial system have resulted in serious and lingering economic problems in many countries, including the UK and the US. Indeed, the impact of public sector balance sheets absorbing losses of the banking sector has had the after-effect of contributing to sovereign debt crises in several smaller European jurisdictions — which continue to plague investors, taxpayers and the wider economy.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/02/14/credit-quality-as-a-bonus-underpin/#more-15476" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Credit Quality as a Bonus Underpin">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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