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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Is Carl Icahn Good for Long-Term Shareholders? &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Is Carl Icahn Good for Long-Term Shareholders?</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/03/02/is-carl-icahn-good-for-long-term-shareholders/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=is-carl-icahn-good-for-long-term-shareholders</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Mar 2011 14:22:47 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hedge funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[In the paper, Is Carl Icahn Good for Long-Term Shareholders? A Case Study of Shareholder Activism, which was recently published in the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, we examine the case of Carl Icahn, whose career as a shareholder activist now spans at least three decades. The increase in activist campaigns by entrepreneurial investors and [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday, March 2, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from Subramanian Iyer and <a href="http://spears.okstate.edu/directory/40-finance/695-rrao" target="_blank">Ramesh Rao</a> of the Finance Department at Oklahoma State University, and <a href="http://faculty.tamucc.edu/vvenkiteshwaran/" target="_blank">Vinod Venkiteshwaran</a> of the Finance Department at Texas A&amp;M.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In the paper, <strong><em>Is Carl Icahn Good for Long-Term Shareholders? A Case Study of Shareholder Activism</em></strong>, which was recently published in the <em>Journal of Applied Corporate Finance</em>, we examine the case of Carl Icahn, whose career as a shareholder activist now spans at least three decades. The increase in activist campaigns by entrepreneurial investors and hedge funds in the past decade has raised considerable debate about their benefits for average shareholders. Although critics have longed charged that the proposals for change by such active investors typically do not increase the longer-run efficiency and values of the targeted companies, more recent studies have provided evidence of success, both in terms of increasing the market value of such companies and achieving at least some of the investors&#8217; expressed objectives.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/03/02/is-carl-icahn-good-for-long-term-shareholders/#more-16005" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Is Carl Icahn Good for Long-Term Shareholders?">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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