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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Corporate Governance Adrift &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Corporate Governance Adrift</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/03/18/corporate-governance-adrift/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=corporate-governance-adrift</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Mar 2011 15:34:46 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Having served as a member of the NYSE committee that created the NYSE’s post-Enron corporate governance rules, I have watched with dismay as those rules have been misunderstood, misapplied and polluted by one-size-fits-all “best practices” invented by proxy advisory services and other governance activists. In the recent Hewlett-Packard case, ISS took the position that the [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Friday, March 18, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/Page.cfm/Thread/Attorneys/SubThread/Search/Name/Lipton,%20Martin" target="_blank">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Having served as a member of the NYSE committee that created the NYSE’s post-Enron corporate governance rules, I have watched with dismay as those rules have been misunderstood, misapplied and polluted by one-size-fits-all “best practices” invented by proxy advisory services and other governance activists. In the recent Hewlett-Packard case, ISS took the position that the participation by the CEO in the search for new directors tainted the process and warranted a recommendation by ISS for a no vote on the reelection of members of Hewlett-Packard’s nominating and governance committee. See March 11, 2011 <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/03/17/iss-goes-with-form-over-substance/" target="_blank">memo</a>. Apart from the fundamental policy issue as to whether the principal purpose of the board of directors is to monitor the performance of the CEO or to advise as to strategy, the Hewlett-Packard case raises the equally important issue of how the board should function on a day-to-day basis.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/03/18/corporate-governance-adrift/#more-16840" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Corporate Governance Adrift">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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