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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/05/06/private-equity-and-the-resolution-of-financial-distress/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=private-equity-and-the-resolution-of-financial-distress</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 06 May 2011 13:08:43 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bankruptcy & Financial Distress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Private Equity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bankruptcy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Distressed companies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Leverage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Per Strömberg]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Private equity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Restructurings]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In the paper, Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine how private equity owners influence the outcome of distressed restructurings and the costs of financial distress. The impact of PE ownership on the likelihood or severity of distress is unclear. There are several reasons [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday, May 6, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.bc.edu/schools/csom/faculty/bios/hotchkiss.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Edie Hotchkiss</a> of the Finance Department at Boston College, <a href="http://www.commerce.virginia.edu/faculty_research/facultydirectory/Pages/SmithDC.aspx" target="_blank" rel="noopener">David C. Smith</a> of the McIntire School of Commerce at the University of Virginia, and <a href="http://www.sifr.org/pelle.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Per Strömberg</a> of the Institute of Financial Research (SIFR) and Professor of Finance at the Stockholm School of Economics.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In the paper, <strong><em>Private Equity and the Resolution of Financial Distress</em></strong>, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we examine how private equity owners influence the outcome of distressed restructurings and the costs of financial distress. The impact of PE ownership on the likelihood or severity of distress is unclear. There are several reasons to expect a positive role for PE sponsors. The discipline of high leverage could lead to higher operating efficiency and lower the chance of financial distress. Further, if value declines, PE owners have strong incentives to correct this decline to preserve their equity stake, including by committing capital to support the distressed company. PE sponsors also have an incentive to preserve their reputation with lenders and future investors, even when they may lose an insolvent firm during restructuring. On the negative side, actions by aggressive private equity owners to boost their financial return, such as leveraging up a firm to pay large dividends, could drain needed liquidity from PE-owned firms and put these firms at a higher risk of default.</p>
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