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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>SEC Strengthens Shareholders’ Role In Corporate Political Speech Decisions &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>SEC Strengthens Shareholders’ Role In Corporate Political Speech Decisions</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/05/15/sec-strengthens-shareholders-role-in-corporate-political-speech-decisions/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=sec-strengthens-shareholders-role-in-corporate-political-speech-decisions</link>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 15 May 2011 15:04:54 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Citizens United v. FEC]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC makes clear that corporations have considerable freedom to spend corporate funds on elections. In an article published in the Harvard Law Review last November, Lucian Bebchuk and I argued that, in the wake of Citizens United, lawmakers should reconsider the corporate-law rules governing who decides [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Columbia Law School, on Sunday, May 15, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Robert_Jackson" target="_blank">Robert J. Jackson, Jr.</a> is Associate Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. His paper with <a href="http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/" target="_blank">Lucian Bebchuk</a>, “Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?”, is available <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1670085" target="_blank">here</a>, and a previous Forum post discussing the paper is available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/09/08/corporate-political-speech-who-decides" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The Supreme Court’s recent decision in <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/citizens-opinion.pdf" target="_blank"><em>Citizens United v. FEC</em></a> makes clear that corporations have considerable freedom to spend corporate funds on elections. In an article published in the <em>Harvard Law Review</em> last November, Lucian Bebchuk and I argued that, in the wake of <em>Citizens United</em>, lawmakers should reconsider the corporate-law rules governing who decides how corporations use this freedom. Specifically, we argued that these rules should give shareholders a greater role in corporate political speech decisions. Recently, the Securities Exchange Commission provided important guidance that will strengthen shareholders’ role in deciding whether and how corporations spend on elections.</p>
<p>Under existing corporate-law rules, corporate political speech decisions are subject to the same rules as ordinary business decisions. Thus, political speech decisions can generally be made without input from shareholders, a role for independent directors, or detailed disclosure—the safeguards that corporate-law rules establish for special corporate decisions. In our article, we argued that the rules governing ordinary business decisions are inappropriate for corporate political speech, and proposed rules to strengthen the role of shareholders and independent directors, and mandate special disclosure, when directors and executives seek to spend corporate funds on elections.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/05/15/sec-strengthens-shareholders-role-in-corporate-political-speech-decisions/#more-17824" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading SEC Strengthens Shareholders’ Role In Corporate Political Speech Decisions">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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