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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Employee Stock Ownership Plans &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Employee Stock Ownership Plans</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/05/23/employee-stock-ownership-plans/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=employee-stock-ownership-plans</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 23 May 2011 14:51:00 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Employees]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firm valuation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Incentives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stock options]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In our paper, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Employee Compensation and Firm Value, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we investigate whether adopting a broad-based employee stock ownership plan enhances productivity by improving team incentives and co-monitoring. That is, does employee capitalism work? If so, how are gains divided between shareholders and employees? We [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday, May 23, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.bus.umich.edu/facultybios/FacultyBio.asp?id=000119745" target="_blank">E. Han Kim</a>, Professor of Finance and International Business at the University of Michigan, and <a href="http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/Faculty/search/detail.cfm?person_id=948" target="_blank">Paige Ouimet</a> of the Finance Department at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In our paper, <strong><em>Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Employee Compensation and Firm Value</em></strong>, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we investigate whether adopting a broad-based employee stock ownership plan enhances productivity by improving team incentives and co-monitoring. That is, does employee capitalism work? If so, how are gains divided between shareholders and employees?</p>
<p>We find that small ESOPs increase productivity. Unlike Jones and Kato (1995) on Japanese ESOPs, our evidence of productivity gains is based on the effects on two main beneficiaries of such gains: employees and shareholders. Because our evidence indicates both stakeholders gain from adopting small ESOPs, we infer employee share ownership increases the size of the economic pie by improving worker productivity.</p>
<p>This causal interpretation is substantiated by our evidence on how the division of productivity gains is related to employee mobility within an establishment’s industry and location of work place. We find that when labor mobility increases, increasing workers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis shareholders’, employees’ share of gains increases and stockholders’ share decreases.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/05/23/employee-stock-ownership-plans/#more-18202" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Employee Stock Ownership Plans">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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