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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Change &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Change</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/06/25/too-big-to-fail-or-too-big-to-change/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=too-big-to-fail-or-too-big-to-change</link>
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		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jun 2011 16:34:05 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Financial Crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Regulation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Corporate fraud]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Too big to fail]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Two and half years removed from the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the investing public has grown increasingly frustrated with the lack of criminal prosecutions of, and absence of truly significant fines levied against, the senior executives and companies responsible for igniting the subprime meltdown. Pundits have criticized the Securities and Exchange Commission [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Chad Johnson, Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, on Saturday, June 25, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.blbglaw.com/attorneys/data/johnson_chad" target="_blank">Chad Johnson</a> is a partner in the litigation practice at Bernstein Litowitz Berger &amp; Grossmann LLP. This post is based on an article by <a href="http://www.blbglaw.com/attorneys/data/shikowitz_ross" target="_blank">Ross Shikowitz</a> in the Spring 2011 edition of the BLB&amp;G publication <a href="http://www.blbglaw.com/institutional_investor_services/advocate/index" target="_new">Advocate for Institutional Investors</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Two and half years removed from the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, the investing public has grown increasingly frustrated with the lack of criminal prosecutions of, and absence of truly significant fines levied against, the senior executives and companies responsible for igniting the subprime meltdown. Pundits have criticized the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and the Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) as capitulating to the interests of “big finance,” citing SEC settlements that have been characterized as mere “slaps on the wrist” and the DOJ’s failure to convict a single executive responsible for creating the “great recession” despite significant evidence of intentional misconduct.</p>
<p>For decades, the public’s trust in the integrity of U.S. capital markets was a source of economic stability and unparalleled prosperity. To maintain this trust, investors must believe that they compete on a relatively equal playing field and that the laws governing the markets will be strictly enforced. In furtherance of these goals, violators of federal rules face civil penalties from the SEC or criminal prosecution by the DOJ. In connection with previous corporate scandals, the government held a significant number of the principal wrongdoers civilly and criminally accountable for their misconduct. In the wake of the current financial crisis, however, many argue that the lack of such accountability has eroded the public’s faith in U.S. capital markets.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/06/25/too-big-to-fail-or-too-big-to-change/#more-18740" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Change">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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