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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Change of Control Special Committee: Breathing Life into CNX &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Change of Control Special Committee: Breathing Life into CNX</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/07/23/change-of-control-special-committee-breathing-life-into-cnx/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=change-of-control-special-committee-breathing-life-into-cnx</link>
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		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Jul 2011 14:43:33 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Litigation & Enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[In re CNX Gas Corp.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Merger litigation]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Notwithstanding the excellence of the Delaware judiciary, the multiple standards of review under Delaware law for reviewing the actions of a target’s directors involved in a merger or acquisition transaction are cumbersome, a source of needless litigation, and economically inefficient. In my paper Change of Control Special Committee: Breathing Life into CNX, recently made public [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Scott Hirst, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Saturday, July 23, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://law.psu.edu/faculty/resident_faculty/thompson" target="_blank">Samuel C. Thompson Jr.</a>, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Study of Mergers &amp; Acquisitions at the Pennsylvania State University School of Law. This post is part of the <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>, which is co-sponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Notwithstanding the excellence of the Delaware judiciary, the multiple standards of review under Delaware law for reviewing the actions of a target’s directors involved in a merger or acquisition transaction are cumbersome, a source of needless litigation, and economically inefficient. In my paper <strong><em>Change of Control Special Committee: Breathing Life into </em>CNX</strong>, recently made public on SSRN, I put forward a proposal to resolve these issues through changes in Delaware’s General Corporation Law (“DGCL”). DGCL should be amended to permit the shareholders of a corporation to adopt a provision requiring that if the corporation becomes a target of a bona fide acquisition proposal, the board of the corporation must petition the Delaware Court of Chancery for the appointment of an independent, disinterested, and knowledgeable special committee of the board (a “Change of Control Special Committee”). This Committee would have complete power over the acquisition transaction. At the discretion of the Delaware Court of Chancery, a member of the current board could be appointed to the Change of Control Special Committee.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/07/23/change-of-control-special-committee-breathing-life-into-cnx/#more-19456" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Change of Control Special Committee: Breathing Life into CNX">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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