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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Implications of the Proxy Access Case &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Implications of the Proxy Access Case</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/08/23/implications-of-the-proxy-access-case/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=implications-of-the-proxy-access-case</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Aug 2011 13:15:39 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Business Roundtable v. SEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy access]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a long-awaited decision in the case of Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange Commission, No. 10-1305 slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jul. 22, 2011), which vacated Rule 14a-11, the SEC&#8217;s shareholder access rule. By vacating the rule, the [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Tuesday, August 23, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.cov.com/dmartin/" target="_blank">David B.H. Martin</a>, co-head of the securities practice at Covington &amp; Burling LLP, and is based on a Covington advisory memorandum by Mr. Martin and <a href="http://www.cov.com/kgumbs/" target="_blank">Keir D. Gumbs</a>. Other posts related to proxy access, including a number by Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst of the Program on Corporate Governance, are available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/tag/proxy-access/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a long-awaited decision in the case of <em>Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce v. Securities and Exchange Commission</em>, No. 10-1305 slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jul. 22, 2011), which vacated Rule 14a-11, the SEC&#8217;s shareholder access rule. By vacating the rule, the D.C. Circuit has dealt a significant blow to the SEC’s longstanding efforts to adopt a rule that would require, under certain circumstances, that public companies include in their proxy materials shareholder-proposed nominees to the board of directors. The decision also has import that goes significantly beyond shareholder access, as it will challenge the SEC (and, likely, other agencies) in assessing the economic consequences of future rulemakings. Nevertheless, the court’s decision does not end the shareholder access debate. Under an amendment to the shareholder proposal rule (Rule 14a-8) that was adopted last year at the same time as the shareholder access rule and voluntarily stayed by the SEC pending the outcome of the shareholder access rule litigation, shareholders may yet be able to submit shareholder proposals that seek to establish shareholder access regimes in 2012. The SEC has not yet indicated whether it will lift this stay, but there is no legal reason why it could not do so.</p>
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