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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Are Busy Boards Detrimental?  &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Are Busy Boards Detrimental?</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/08/24/are-busy-boards-detrimental/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=are-busy-boards-detrimental</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Aug 2011 13:18:32 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Private Equity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board dynamics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IPOs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Venture capital firms]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In our paper, Are Busy Boards Detrimental?, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we attempt to measure effects of busy directors serving on the boards of venture-backed IPO firms, and by so doing, address concerns that busy boards are detrimental and that multiple directorships should be limited. The issue of busy boards has [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday, August 24, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://php.smeal.psu.edu/smeal/dirbio/displayBio.php?t_user_id=lcf4" target="_blank">Laura Casares Field</a>, <a href="http://www.entrepreneurship.psu.edu/smeal/dirbio/displayBio.php?t_user_id=mbl3" target="_blank">Michelle Lowry</a>, and Anahit Mkrtchyan, all of the Department of Finance at Pennsylvania State University.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In our paper, <strong><em>Are Busy Boards Detrimental?</em></strong>, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we attempt to measure effects of busy directors serving on the boards of venture-backed IPO firms, and by so doing, address concerns that busy boards are detrimental and that multiple directorships should be limited. The issue of busy boards has received considerable attention in the academic literature and popular press. Yet, even though the academic literature has long recognized that venture capitalists are active on the boards of IPO firms in which they have invested, it is silent on the effects, or even the existence, of busy directors on IPO firms’ boards.</p>
<p>A recent <em>Wall Street Journal</em> article, “Start-Ups Grumble About Directors Too Busy To Help” (7/29/2010), discusses this very issue of the costs and benefits of busy directors among young firms. Focusing on the negative aspects of busy boards, the <em>Wall Street Journal </em>article articulates entrepreneurs’ concerns that venture capitalist directors are juggling too many companies and that the hands-on guidance they can provide to their portfolio companies becomes diluted. Consistent with evidence presented in this paper, however, a number of associated commentaries by executives of private companies with busy boards on the WSJ.com website emphasize that busy directors also provide substantial benefits to the companies on which they serve. The following quote from executive Marcie Black of BandGap, Inc. incorporates the sentiments of several executives’ posts: “The article focuses heavily on the amount of attention a board member offers, but it’s the quality of attention that matters. Many abilities of a mentor improve as they sit on more boards—experience, breadth of network, personal skills, and sense of perspective. No matter the issue that we’re confronting, Forest [board member at BandGap Inc. who also serves on 19 other Boards] has seen it before and usually more than once. The clarity I get from a 20 minute conversation is worth hours from a less experienced mentor.” The executive commentaries to the <em>WSJ </em>article are consistent with our evidence that busy directors can provide strong benefits to young firms’ boards.</p>
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