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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Bribes and Benefits &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Bribes and Benefits</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/09/09/bribes-and-benefits/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=bribes-and-benefits</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Sep 2011 14:40:06 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anti-corruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compliance & ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firm performance]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In the paper, Which firms benefit from bribes, and by how much? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we analyze a hand-collected sample of 166 prominent bribery cases, involving 107 publicly listed firms from 20 stock markets that have been reported to have bribed government officials in 52 [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by R. Christopher Small, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Friday, September 9, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The following post comes to us from <a href="http://net3.hkbu.edu.hk/%7Ebus/hkbusob/live/html/en/excel.php?id=scheungHKB&amp;cv=0004" target="_blank">Yan-Leung Cheung</a>, Professor of Finance at Hong Kong Baptist University; <a href="http://www.raghurau.com/" target="_blank">P. Raghavendra Rau</a>, Professor of Finance at the University of Cambridge; and <a href="http://net3.hkbu.edu.hk/%7Ebus/hkbusob/live/html/en/excel.php?id=stouraHKB&amp;cv=0004" target="_blank">Aris Stouraitis</a>, Professor of Finance at Hong Kong Baptist University.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In the paper, <strong><em>Which firms benefit from bribes, and by how much? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide</em></strong>, which was recently made publicly available on SSRN, we analyze a hand-collected sample of 166 prominent bribery cases, involving 107 publicly listed firms from 20 stock markets that have been reported to have bribed government officials in 52 countries worldwide during 1971-2007. Prior papers have focused on the date of the revelation of the bribe on the firm’s stock price.</p>
<p>Our research questions are different from this literature. We try to answer three questions. First, who bribes? Second, how much do they pay? Third, what benefits do they get? In contrast to prior literature, to answer our research questions, we focus on the initial date of award of the contract for which the bribe was paid. At that time, the market was unaware that the firm obtained a particular contract by paying a bribe. So the change in market capitalization of the firm on the bribe paying date (which is only available ex-post) provides the magnitude of benefits firms get from the bribe. By subtracting the value of the bribe from the benefits, we get a measure of the NPV for the bribe.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/09/09/bribes-and-benefits/#more-21517" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Bribes and Benefits">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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