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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>A Closer Look at Antitrust Reverse Termination Fees &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>A Closer Look at Antitrust Reverse Termination Fees</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/09/13/a-closer-look-at-antitrust-reverse-termination-fees/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=a-closer-look-at-antitrust-reverse-termination-fees</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2011 13:38:19 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Antitrust]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Termination fees]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Perhaps no topic has engendered more conversation among dealmakers in recent months than the allocation between merging parties of the risk of obtaining antitrust approval of a proposed acquisition. With the increase in strategic combinations and the expectation of a more robust regulatory environment under the current administration, many recent merger agreements feature painstakingly negotiated [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by David Fox, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, on Tuesday, September 13, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&amp;itemID=9712" target="_blank">David Fox</a> is a partner at Kirkland &amp; Ellis LLP, focusing on complex mergers and acquisitions as a member of that firm&#8217;s Corporate Group. This post is based on a Kirkland &amp; Ellis <em>M&amp;A Update</em> by Mr. Fox, <a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentid=220&amp;itemid=10177" target="_blank">Timothy Muris</a>, and <a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&amp;itemID=10178" target="_blank">Christine Wilson</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Perhaps no topic has engendered more conversation among dealmakers in recent months than the allocation between merging parties of the risk of obtaining antitrust approval of a proposed acquisition. With the increase in strategic combinations and the expectation of a more robust regulatory environment under the current administration, many recent merger agreements feature painstakingly negotiated provisions to address these risks. While much attention has been devoted to headline-grabbing reverse termination fees payable to the seller by the buyer upon failure to obtain required antitrust approvals in such deals as Google/Motorola Mobility ($2.5 billion or 20% of deal value) and AT&amp;T/T-Mobile (~$6 billion of value/15%), it is important to realize that the reverse termination fee is just one facet (as often absent as not) of a complex matrix of provisions in the merger agreement that ultimately determines the risk-sharing between the parties on this issue.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/09/13/a-closer-look-at-antitrust-reverse-termination-fees/#more-21565" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading A Closer Look at Antitrust Reverse Termination Fees">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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