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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Delaware Court Upholds Board Discretion in Setting Compensation Practices &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Delaware Court Upholds Board Discretion in Setting Compensation Practices</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/11/19/delaware-court-upholds-board-discretion-in-setting-compensation-practices/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=delaware-court-upholds-board-discretion-in-setting-compensation-practices</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/11/19/delaware-court-upholds-board-discretion-in-setting-compensation-practices/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 19 Nov 2011 15:33:43 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Court Cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Securities Litigation & Enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[In re Goldman Sachs]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[In dismissing a wide-ranging stockholder challenge to compensation practices at Goldman Sachs, the Delaware Court of Chancery has issued a strong reaffirmation of traditional principles of the common law of executive compensation.  The decision emphasizes that boards are free to encourage and reward risk-taking by employees and that Delaware law protects directors who adopt compensation [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Paul Rowe, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Saturday, November 19, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/PKRowe" target="_blank">Paul Rowe</a> is a Partner in the Litigation Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Rowe, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/JMOBrien" target="_blank">Jeannemarie O’Brien</a>, and <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/JLGoldstein" target="_blank">Jeremy Goldstein</a>. This post is part of the <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>, which is co-sponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In dismissing a wide-ranging stockholder challenge to compensation practices at Goldman Sachs, the Delaware Court of Chancery has issued a strong reaffirmation of traditional principles of the common law of executive compensation.  The decision emphasizes that boards are free to encourage and reward risk-taking by employees and that Delaware law protects directors who adopt compensation programs in good faith.  <em><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/docs/InreTheGoldmanSachs%20GroupIncShareholderLitigation_Oct122011.pdf" target="_blank">In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation (Oct. 12, 2011)</a></em>.</p>
<p>Shareholders of Goldman Sachs brought suit on a variety of theories, claiming that Goldman’s compensation policies, which emphasized net revenues, rewarded employees with bonuses for taking risks but failed to penalize them for losing money; that the directors allocated too much of the firm’s resources to individual compensation versus investment in the business; that while the firm adopted a “pay for performance” philosophy, actual pay practices failed to align stockholder and employee interests; and that the board should have known that the effect of the compensation practices was to encourage employees to engage in risky and/or unlawful conduct using corporate assets.  In dismissing the claims, the Court relied on basic principles of Delaware law.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/11/19/delaware-court-upholds-board-discretion-in-setting-compensation-practices/#more-22934" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Delaware Court Upholds Board Discretion in Setting Compensation Practices">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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