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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Another SEC Clawback Settlement &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Another SEC Clawback Settlement</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/12/13/another-sec-clawback-settlement/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=another-sec-clawback-settlement</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/12/13/another-sec-clawback-settlement/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Dec 2011 14:36:47 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Litigation & Enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Clawbacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC v. Jenkins]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[On November 15, 2011, the SEC announced a settlement in which it “clawed back” incentive based compensation from a former CEO who was not accused of any wrongdoing.  The result, however, may send mixed signals.  On the one hand, the SEC’s ability to achieve this result in a no-fault clawback case may very well encourage [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Wayne M. Carlin, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Tuesday, December 13, 2011 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/WMCarlin" target="_blank">Wayne Carlin</a> is a partner in the Litigation Department at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton firm memorandum by Mr. Carlin, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/JFSavarese" target="_blank">John F. Savarese</a>, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/DAKatz" target="_blank">David A. Katz</a>, and <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/DBAnders" target="_blank">David B. Anders</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>On November 15, 2011, the SEC announced a settlement in which it “clawed back” incentive based compensation from a former CEO who was not accused of any wrongdoing.  The result, however, may send mixed signals.  On the one hand, the SEC’s ability to achieve this result in a no-fault clawback case may very well encourage the SEC staff to continue to enforce this remedy, even in cases where the CEO or CFO has no personal responsibility for misconduct.  On the other hand, the settlement of $2.8 million was less than the $4 million that the SEC originally sought to recover from the former CEO.</p>
<p>The case, <em><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/docs/SECVJenkins09-cv-1510-136.pdf" target="_blank">SEC v. Jenkins, No. CV 09-1510</a></em>, involved Maynard L. Jenkins, the former CEO of CSK Auto Corporation.  Although civil and criminal charges were brought against four other CSK Auto executives, the SEC did not charge Jenkins with any wrongdoing in connection with the accounting fraud that occurred at CSK.  Nevertheless, relying on <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/docs/15USC7243.pdf" target="_blank">Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley</a>, the SEC filed a complaint seeking to claw back $4 million of incentive compensation that Jenkins received during the period of the fraud.  Jenkins moved to dismiss the complaint, but that motion was denied in June 2010.  (See our memo, <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/04/06/sec-claws-back-again/" target="_blank">“Sarbanes-Oxley Clawback Developments”, June 16, 2010</a>.)</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/12/13/another-sec-clawback-settlement/#more-23499" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Another SEC Clawback Settlement">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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