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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Protecting Directors When Firms Fail Post-Merger &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Protecting Directors When Firms Fail Post-Merger</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/01/protecting-directors-when-firms-fail-post-merger/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=protecting-directors-when-firms-fail-post-merger</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/01/protecting-directors-when-firms-fail-post-merger/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Mar 2012 14:36:54 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Bankruptcy & Financial Distress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Litigation & Enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bankruptcy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[D&O insurance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fiduciary duties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lyondell Chemical v. Ryan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Target firms]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The aftermath of the recent acquisition of Lyondell by Basell provides a striking example of the risk that directors face if they approve a cash merger financed in substantial part through borrowing and the target then fails. The deal was characterized as an “absolute home run” by Lyondell’s financial advisor. [1] But less than thirteen [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Scott J. Davis, Mayer Brown LLP, on Thursday, March 1, 2012 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.mayerbrown.com/lawyers/profile.asp?hubbardid=D780794621" target="_blank">Scott Davis</a> is the head of the US Mergers and Acquisitions group at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on an article by Mr. Davis and <a href="http://www.mayerbrown.com/lawyers/profile.asp?hubbardid=K298561216" target="_blank">William R. Kucera</a> that first appeared in <em>Insights: The Corporate &amp; Securities Law Advisor</em>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The aftermath of the recent acquisition of Lyondell by Basell provides a striking example of the risk that directors face if they approve a cash <a name="1b"></a>merger financed in substantial part through borrowing and the target then fails. The deal was characterized as an “absolute home run” by Lyondell’s financial advisor. <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/03/01/protecting-directors-when-firms-fail-post-merger#1">[1]</a> But less than thirteen months after the closing of the merger in December 2007, Lyondell filed for bankruptcy. A litigation trust established by the bankruptcy court to marshal the debtor’s assets has sued Lyondell’s former directors, <a name="2b"></a>seeking damages on the theory that the merger, while beneficial to Lyondell’s shareholders, unlawfully mistreated Lyondell’s creditors by causing the company to become insolvent. <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/03/01/protecting-directors-when-firms-fail-post-merger#2">[2]</a> The case is pending. To add to the directors’ problems, the excess <a name="3b"></a>directors’ and officers’ insurance carrier has declined coverage on several grounds, among them that, because the litigation trust stands in Lyondell’s shoes, this is an “insured v. insured” matter not covered by the D&amp;O policy. <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/03/01/protecting-directors-when-firms-fail-post-merger#3">[3]</a></p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/01/protecting-directors-when-firms-fail-post-merger/#more-26437" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Protecting Directors When Firms Fail Post-Merger">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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