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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>SEC Permits Exclusion of Most Common Proxy Access Proposal &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>SEC Permits Exclusion of Most Common Proxy Access Proposal</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/27/sec-permits-exclusion-of-most-common-proxy-access-proposal/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=sec-permits-exclusion-of-most-common-proxy-access-proposal</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/27/sec-permits-exclusion-of-most-common-proxy-access-proposal/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 13:12:25 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Director nominations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[No-action letters]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy access]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rule 14a-8]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Recently, the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has issued a number of no-action letters responding to company requests to exclude shareholder proxy access proposals from the proxy statement for the company’s 2012 annual meeting. The SEC staff permitted the exclusion of the most common form, a precatory 1% or 100-holder proposal based [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by James Morphy, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, on Tuesday, March 27, 2012 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.sullcrom.com/lawyers/detail.aspx?attorney=246" target="_blank">James Morphy</a> is a partner at Sullivan &amp; Cromwell LLP specializing in mergers &amp; acquisitions and corporate governance. This post is based on a Sullivan &amp; Cromwell publication. Work from the Program on Corporate Governance about shareholder voting includes <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1513408" target="_blank">Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate</a> by Bebchuk and Hirst; more posts about proxy access are available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/tag/proxy-access/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Recently, the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has issued a number of no-action letters responding to company requests to exclude shareholder proxy access proposals from the proxy statement for the company’s 2012 annual meeting. The SEC staff permitted the exclusion of the most common form, a precatory 1% or 100-holder proposal based on a model issued by the United States Proxy Exchange, but did not allow exclusion of others, including the Norges Bank binding 1% proposal. These no-action letters serve as a reminder that, although changes to SEC Rule 14a-8 that took effect last year permit shareholders to propose the adoption of proxy access provisions, these proxy access proposals will not be afforded special treatment under the SEC rules and will continue to be subject to exclusion under the traditional bases set forth in Rule 14a-8.</p>
<p>As a result of the SEC staff’s concurrence as to the excludability of the most common form of proposal, there will be a more limited number of proxy access proposals coming to a vote in the 2012 proxy season. The terms of proxy access proposals in future years are likely to depend, to a large extent, on the level of shareholder support received by this limited group.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/27/sec-permits-exclusion-of-most-common-proxy-access-proposal/#more-27042" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading SEC Permits Exclusion of Most Common Proxy Access Proposal">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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