In the paper, Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation, forthcoming in the Journal of Accounting Research, we investigate the contracting implications of the transition to IFRS. Specifically, we examine how the mandatory adoption of IFRS affects the contractual usefulness of accounting information in executive compensation, as reflected in pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) and relative performance evaluation (RPE). These tests allow us to infer whether compensation committees of European companies view IFRS as leading to increased earnings quality and comparability.

The mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on January 1, 2005, by the European Union (EU) and several other countries (e.g., Australia; South Africa) marks major progress toward a single set of high-quality, globally accepted accounting standards (Daske et al., [2008]). IFRS is primarily aimed at enhancing earnings quality and achieving a high degree of comparability of financial statements (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council). The extant research, however, has provided mixed evidence on whether mandatory IFRS adoption has achieved these goals (e.g., Barth et al., [2008], Ahmed et al. [2010], DeFond et al. [2011], Lang et al. [2010]).

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