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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>“Toehold” Stakes in Target Firms &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>“Toehold” Stakes in Target Firms</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/15/toehold-stakes-in-target-firms/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=toehold-stakes-in-target-firms</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 13:23:48 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Mergers & Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Minority shareholders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Target firms]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=28694?d=20150113142712EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Whether or not to acquire a minority or “toehold” stake in a public company as a preliminary step towards a future business combination has been the subject of tactical debate for many years. Proponents argue that a toehold can be used by a potential bidder to convey its serious intent or, if necessary, as a [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by David Fox, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, on Tuesday, May 15, 2012 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&amp;itemID=9712" target="_blank">David Fox</a> is a partner at Kirkland &amp; Ellis LLP, focusing on complex mergers and acquisitions as a member of the firm&#8217;s Corporate Group. This post is based on a Kirkland &amp; Ellis <em>M&amp;A Update</em> by Mr. Fox, <a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&amp;itemID=9713" target="_blank">Daniel E. Wolf</a>, <a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&amp;itemID=9916" target="_blank">Joshua M. Zachariah</a>, and <a href="http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=220&amp;itemID=10281" target="_blank">David B. Feirstein</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Whether or not to acquire a minority or “toehold” stake in a public company as a preliminary step towards a future business combination has been the subject of tactical debate for many years. Proponents argue that a toehold can be used by a potential bidder to convey its serious intent or, if necessary, as a platform to quietly or publicly put the target in play. In addition, the position could advantage a buyer in a subsequent sale process by reducing its average cost (by acquiring shares before a deal premium attaches) or acquiring a meaningful voting position in the target; at the very least, the profit on the toehold that the acquirer can collect if another buyer succeeds with a higher bid may cover, or exceed, the costs the acquirer incurs in pursuing the target. On the flip side, demurrers point out the risk of being perceived as employing strong-arm tactics when a velvet glove approach is more likely to win over the “hearts and minds” of the target. Moreover, many a target board may reflexively react in an unduly defensive manner, for example by enacting a poison pill, complicating an attempt to reach a negotiated outcome at a desirable price.</p>
<p>The debate has recently sharpened with comments from at least one Delaware judge who has taken the view that the failure to acquire a stake before approaching a target conveys a lack of seriousness about making a potential bid and is evidence of being a “stupid acquirer.” A small stake (even as little as 100 shares) in a potential target represents a low-cost option for better positioning the acquirer in the event of litigation if a sale process does not unfold in the way the buyer would like (e.g., the target board refuses to engage with the buyer or agrees to a sale to another buyer). Only by owning a stake will the buyer have “standing” as a shareholder of the target to bring legal claims against the target or its board, a need that may not become apparent until it is too late to rectify.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/15/toehold-stakes-in-target-firms/#more-28694" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading “Toehold” Stakes in Target Firms">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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