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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Don’t Discourage Outside Shareholders &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Don’t Discourage Outside Shareholders</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/08/15/dont-discourage-outside-shareholders/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=dont-discourage-outside-shareholders</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/08/15/dont-discourage-outside-shareholders/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Aug 2012 20:58:09 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Op-Eds & Opinions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Program News & Events]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Blockholders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Schedule 13D]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[Editor’s Note: Lucian Bebchuk is a Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School. The New York Times DealBook published today a piece I wrote, titled Don’t Discourage Outside Shareholders. The piece, available here, focuses on the SEC’s ongoing consideration of a rulemaking petition that [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div style="background: #F8F8F8;padding: 10px;margin-top: 5px;margin-bottom: 10px"><strong>Editor’s Note:</strong> <a href="http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/" target="_blank">Lucian Bebchuk</a> is a Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School.</div>
<p>The <em>New York Times </em>DealBook published today a piece I wrote, titled <a href="http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/15/dont-discourage-outside-shareholders/" target="_blank">Don’t Discourage Outside Shareholders</a>. The piece, available <a href="http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/15/dont-discourage-outside-shareholders/" target="_blank">here</a>, focuses on the SEC’s ongoing consideration of a <a href="http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf" target="_blank">rulemaking petition</a> that advocates tightening the rules governing how quickly shareholders must disclose when they hold 5 percent or more of a company’s shares. I argue that such tightening could well unduly discourage the creation and activism of outside blockholders.</p>
<p>In contrast to the claims of the petition’s authors, the proposal should not be viewed as a “technical” closing of a loophole but rather as one that raises significant policy issues. In considering these issues, considerable weight should be given to the significant empirical evidence that the presence and involvement of outside blockholders enhances a company’s value and performance. Furthermore, the rules governing the balance of power between incumbents and outside blockholders are now substantially tilted in favor of insiders — both relative to earlier times and to other countries — rather than outside shareholders. This tilt counsels against tightening SEC rules in ways that would further disadvantage outsiders.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/08/15/dont-discourage-outside-shareholders/#more-31974" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Don’t Discourage Outside Shareholders">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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