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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Dual Class Share Structures: The Next Campaign &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Dual Class Share Structures: The Next Campaign</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/09/16/dual-class-share-structures-the-next-campaign/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=dual-class-share-structures-the-next-campaign</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/09/16/dual-class-share-structures-the-next-campaign/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 16 Sep 2012 14:18:39 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dual-class stock]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder rights]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The arguments over the merits of dual class share structures have been heating up of late. The issue has resurfaced as institutional investors have complained about the increasing number of IPO companies (Facebook, Groupon, Zynga being the most notable) who have gone public as dual class stock companies limiting the rights and influence of shareholders [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Francis H. Byrd, Laurel Hill Advisory Group, on Sunday, September 16, 2012 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="http://www.laurelhill.com/people/francisbyrd.aspx" target="_blank">Francis H. Byrd</a> is Senior Vice President, Corporate Governance &amp; Risk Practice Leader at Laurel Hill Advisory Group. This post is based on a Laurel Hill newsletter by Mr. Byrd.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The arguments over the merits of dual class share structures have been heating up of late. The issue has resurfaced as institutional investors have complained about the increasing number of IPO companies (Facebook, Groupon, Zynga being the most notable) who have gone public as dual class stock companies limiting the rights and influence of shareholders and turning them into economic bystanders.</p>
<p>One of the stories we cited comes from IR Magazine “CalPERS Strategy Could Avoid IPOs with Dual Class Share Structures” discussing how the fund giant is planning to advocate against the use of dual class structures for companies exiting private equity and entering the public market. Earlier in August, at the ABA Business Section CLE conference, in Chicago, there was a panel discussion on the topic (“Dual Class Stock: Value Enhancer or Corporate Governance Killer?”) The panel comprised of institutional investors, a corporate director (and former investment manager), as well as a corporate attorney and Delaware jurist, all squared off on the issue.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/09/16/dual-class-share-structures-the-next-campaign/#more-32967" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Dual Class Share Structures: The Next Campaign">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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